CAJ | 학술논문

基于由单一制造商与单一零售商构成的两级供应链,文章通过设计价格折扣（即制造商给予消费者价格折扣）与交易信用（即零售商向制造商提前付款）组合契约,研究了分散化供应链中的库存控制与协作管理问题,得到了供应链各方成员最优的联合协调策略.研究表明,在市场需求缺乏价格弹性或者弹性系数不够大的情况下,制造商不愿意向消费者提供任何的价格折扣.此时,制造商需要向零售商提供交易信用（即允许零售商延期付款）激励以协调零售商的订货策略;而在需求比较富有价格弹性或者说需求对零售价格比较敏感的时候,制造商与零售商采用价格折扣与交易信用组合契约,能够实现整条供应链的协调以及双方利润的帕累托改善.最后,通过一个数值仿真验证了主要的结论.
기우유단일제조상여단일령수상구성적량급공응련,문장통과설계개격절구（즉제조상급여소비자개격절구）여교역신용（즉령수상향제조상제전부관）조합계약,연구료분산화공응련중적고존공제여협작관리문제,득도료공응련각방성원최우적연합협조책략.연구표명,재시장수구결핍개격탄성혹자탄성계수불구대적정황하,제조상불원의향소비자제공임하적개격절구.차시,제조상수요향령수상제공교역신용（즉윤허령수상연기부관）격려이협조령수상적정화책략;이재수구비교부유개격탄성혹자설수구대령수개격비교민감적시후,제조상여령수상채용개격절구여교역신용조합계약,능구실현정조공응련적협조이급쌍방리윤적파루탁개선.최후,통과일개수치방진험증료주요적결론.
The current market environment has changed dramatically.Many manufacturers are faced with the increasing competitive pressure.They need to do things like directly provide price discounts to consumers by means of sales coupons or cash rebates in order to stimulate the market demand.For instance,General Motors （GM） offered consumers no interest for five years or rebates of $ 3000 for 12 car models and 5 truck models in 2002.Trade credit which is usually in the form of delayed payment or prepayment has been used extensively in practice.It could be regarded as an important component of marketing strategies for firms or a coordination tool for supply chain management.A two-echelon supply chain consists of a single supplier and a single retailer.This paper investigates how the manufacturer should provide consumers with direct price discounts and treat trade credit policy as an incentive scheme which can be observed in many firms＇ business activities.Moreover,we investigate inventory control and coordination issues in a decentralized supply chain with combined contracts of price discount and trade-credit.We also examined how to obtain the supply chain members＇ optimal coordination strategies such as ordering quantities,the price discount rate,and prepaid credit period.Furthermore,a numerical simulation is presented to verify the main results in the article.Finally,we conclude that：（i）The retailer＇s optimal ordering quantities will increase with direct price discounts from the manufacturer.The supplier could propose an ideal price-discount scheme to induce the retailer＇s ordering behavior.（ii） Interestingly,we show that the manufacturer isn＇t willing to give any price discount to consumers if the market demand is price-inelastic or not elastic enough.Thus,the manufacturer has to offer the retailer trade credit （i.e.,allowing the retailer a permissible delay in payments） as an incentive,and coordinate the retailer＇s ordering policy.（iii） However,when the market demand is price-elastic or relatively sensitive to theretail price,the manufacturer,with the use of the combined contract,could obtain more profit than the initial scenario.Theretailer＇s initial optimal profit doesn＇t decrease even with the only trade-credit contract.（iv） Depending upon their relative risk-aversion degree and bargaining power,the supplier and the retailer can reasonably split the earned profit through the Nash asymmetric bargaining model and realize the Pareto improvement of their individual profit.