管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2014年
4期
125~131
,共null页
公交服务 合作治理 控制权 效益
公交服務 閤作治理 控製權 效益
공교복무 합작치리 공제권 효익
public bus service ; cooperation governance ; control right ; benefit
公交服务效益不佳而引发了国有化回潮的现象,其关键在于政府、公交企业和社会群体三方主体在合作中控制权配置不合理.针对此问题,基于合作治理的背景,运用非对称信息条件下的委托代理理论构建公交服务合作的效益模型,探讨公交服务各主体控制权配置及其对效益的影响,并以上海市公交服务的数据进行实证检验.结果表明:公交企业控制权配置受其自身产出水平的影响,产出水平越高的企业,其获得的控制权也就更大;公交企业控制权与效益是“倒U型”关系,只有控制权在合理范围内时才有利于效益的增加;各方主体在自身控制权范围内,其努力水平与效益是“倒U型”关系,表明政府过度干预、社会群体无效参与均不利于效益的提高.据此提出在合作中的战略、战术和执行层级中合理安排各主体控制权.
公交服務效益不佳而引髮瞭國有化迴潮的現象,其關鍵在于政府、公交企業和社會群體三方主體在閤作中控製權配置不閤理.針對此問題,基于閤作治理的揹景,運用非對稱信息條件下的委託代理理論構建公交服務閤作的效益模型,探討公交服務各主體控製權配置及其對效益的影響,併以上海市公交服務的數據進行實證檢驗.結果錶明:公交企業控製權配置受其自身產齣水平的影響,產齣水平越高的企業,其穫得的控製權也就更大;公交企業控製權與效益是“倒U型”關繫,隻有控製權在閤理範圍內時纔有利于效益的增加;各方主體在自身控製權範圍內,其努力水平與效益是“倒U型”關繫,錶明政府過度榦預、社會群體無效參與均不利于效益的提高.據此提齣在閤作中的戰略、戰術和執行層級中閤理安排各主體控製權.
공교복무효익불가이인발료국유화회조적현상,기관건재우정부、공교기업화사회군체삼방주체재합작중공제권배치불합리.침대차문제,기우합작치리적배경,운용비대칭신식조건하적위탁대리이론구건공교복무합작적효익모형,탐토공교복무각주체공제권배치급기대효익적영향,병이상해시공교복무적수거진행실증검험.결과표명:공교기업공제권배치수기자신산출수평적영향,산출수평월고적기업,기획득적공제권야취경대;공교기업공제권여효익시“도U형”관계,지유공제권재합리범위내시재유리우효익적증가;각방주체재자신공제권범위내,기노력수평여효익시“도U형”관계,표명정부과도간예、사회군체무효삼여균불리우효익적제고.거차제출재합작중적전략、전술화집행층급중합리안배각주체공제권.
The market reform of China's urban public bus transportation service has been in trouble for the past several years.The market has failed to meet efficiency,equity,and voice criteria.The local urban governments have increased their roles in public bus transportation markets to deliver public bus service.This paper focuses on the collaboration among local urban governments,operators,and citizens.The main problems needed to be solved are how to collaborate among the three actors,how to increase performance of operators,how to regulate the operators,and how to increase local governments‘ responsibilities and citizens’ roles.To improve public bus service pedormance,one needs to arrange a governance structure for these three actors.Under this condition,this paper uses the principle-agency method to construct a benefit model of public bus service,which explains the allocation of control right and its influence on benefit.This model can help obtain optimum control right,an optimum effort level,and the optimum of public bus service benefit.The model is further tested with the data of Shanghai bus service.The data was collected by email and interview in 2012.Firstly,the results show that the relationship between operators' control right and their output level is positive,which means control rights will be stronger if an operator's output level is higher.So,it is necessary to choose good enterprises by competitive tendering process.Secondly,the relationship between operator's control right and public bus service benefit is an "inverted U" type.When the operator's control right is limited in a certain range,it could encourage the improvement of public bus service benefit.When it passes the critical point,the operator's control right would decrease the public bus service benefit.Thirdly,when the control rights of the three actors are in their ranges,the relationship between output level and public bus service benefit is an "inverted U" type.Therefore,when the output level is in a limit range it can improve the benefit of public bus service The control rights of the three actors are important to the benefit of public bus service.The allocation of control rights is different at strategic level,tactical level,and operational level.During the collaboration period,it is necessary to arrange the control rights of the actors in a suitable range to achieve the optimum benefit.