CAJ | 학술논문

本文试图论证行政发包制在中国作为一种分析政府间关系、官员激励和政府治理的理论框架所具有的独特内涵、价值和意义。行政发包制是指政府内部上下级之间的发包关系。作为一种理想类型，它既有别于韦伯意义上的科层制，也有别于纯粹的外包制，而是居于两者之间的一种混合形态。行政发包制在行政权分配、经济激励和内部控制三个维度上呈现相互配合和内在一致的特征，适合概括中国政府间关系和治理模式的长期稳定而鲜明的特征。提出行政发包制，有助于重新解释许多有关中国政府运行的特征和现象，同时也可以揭示一系列未被现有文献系统关注的政府现象和问题。本文还将行政发包制与“政治锦标赛”理论结合起来，从纵向行政发包和横向晋升竞争两个维度进一步拓展关于官员激励和政府治理的分析深度和广度。
본문시도론증행정발포제재중국작위일충분석정부간관계、관원격려화정부치리적이론광가소구유적독특내함、개치화의의。행정발포제시지정부내부상하급지간적발포관계。작위일충이상류형，타기유별우위백의의상적과층제，야유별우순수적외포제，이시거우량자지간적일충혼합형태。행정발포제재행정권분배、경제격려화내부공제삼개유도상정현상호배합화내재일치적특정，괄합개괄중국정부간관계화치리모식적장기은정이선명적특정。제출행정발포제，유조우중신해석허다유관중국정부운행적특정화현상，동시야가이게시일계렬미피현유문헌계통관주적정부현상화문제。본문환장행정발포제여“정치금표새”이론결합기래，종종향행정발포화횡향진승경쟁량개유도진일보탁전관우관원격려화정부치리적분석심도화엄도。
This paper attempts to demonstrate the significance, relevance and implications of ＂administrative subcontract＂ as an analytical framework to understand China~s intergovernmental relations, bureaucratic incentives, and administrative governance. As an ideal type, administrative subcontract refers to a subcontracting relation inside the government system, represent a hybrid governance structure between bureaucracy in a Weberian sense and pure subcontract which occurs among independent entities without any hierarchical relations. Administrative subcontract exhibits a coherent and consistent set of characteristics along the dimensions of authority relations, economic incentives, and internal control. With respect to authority relations,administrative subcontract features an allocation of authority between the principal and agent where the principal has the formal authority and residual control rights （such as the authority to appoint/remove, supervise and monitor subcontractors and the option to intervene when necessary）, and the agent, by way of subcontracting, enjoys considerable discretion and de facto power to do things in his own way. Under the administrative subcontract regime, the agent is a residual claimant over the budget money or revenues either collected through service-provision or allocated by the principal. In terms of internal control, the administrative subcontract is outcome-oriented rather than procedure/process-oriented. I argue that these three dimensions are complementary and mutually supportive, and tend to commove if the system encounters systematic shocks. This new framework helps us pin down the key and durable features of China＇s intergovernmental relations and administrative governance. The notion of administrative subcontract enables us to reinterpret many puzzling observations and patterns regarding the workings of China＇ s government system and to bring some important and yet long understudied issues to our attention. I will also combine the theory of administrative subcontract with that of political tournaments to extend our analysis of China＇s political incentives and governance. From the viewpoint of vertical subcontracting and horizontal （political） competition inside the government system, I attempt to explain the strength and weakness of China＇ s state capacity in various areas of public services.