CAJ | 학술논문

在复杂合同的采购拍卖中，除价格外投标中还包含其他的质量属性，因价格和质量在量纲和数值上存在较大差异，使得投标策略的选择和赢者决策问题变得更加困难．鉴于此，本文基于简单加权法，提出一种新的赢者决策方案，此方案不仅解决了价格和质量的量纲不统一和数值不可比的难题，而且还简化了评标的计算过程．在新方案下，本文分别给出风险中性者和风险规避者的均衡投标策略，探讨投标人数对均衡投标，投标者收益和采购者收益的影响．结果显示：投标者之间的竞争激烈程度对风险中性者和风险规避者的投标影响方向相同；但是，相对于风险中性者，风险规避者将报出较低的价格和较高的质量；其中，部分结论推广了传统单属性拍卖理论，部分结论较前人的研究成果更加贴近采购现实．
재복잡합동적채구박매중，제개격외투표중환포함기타적질량속성，인개격화질량재량강화수치상존재교대차이，사득투표책략적선택화영자결책문제변득경가곤난．감우차，본문기우간단가권법，제출일충신적영자결책방안，차방안불부해결료개격화질량적량강불통일화수치불가비적난제，이차환간화료평표적계산과정．재신방안하，본문분별급출풍험중성자화풍험규피자적균형투표책략，탐토투표인수대균형투표，투표자수익화채구자수익적영향．결과현시：투표자지간적경쟁격렬정도대풍험중성자화풍험규피자적투표영향방향상동；단시，상대우풍험중성자，풍험규피자장보출교저적개격화교고적질량；기중，부분결론추엄료전통단속성박매이론，부분결론교전인적연구성과경가첩근채구현실．
In procurement auctions for complex contracts, bids involve quality attributes in addition to price. In such situation, the bidding strategy selected and the winner determination problem become more difficult because price and quality have different units and valuation scales. Based on the simple additive weighting method, this article proposes a new winner determination protocol. This protocol not only eliminates the problem caused by different measurement units of price and quality, but also transforms the different components of a bid into comparable scales, and simplifies the calculation of evaluating bids as well. Under our protocol, risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders＇ equilibrium bidding strategies are presented, and the effects of the number of bidders on bidding behavior, bidders＇ payoff and procurer＇s utility are examined, respectively. The result shows that： the competition has the same effect on risk-neutral and risk-averse bidders＇ bidding strategies; however, risk-averse bidders will offer a higher quality at a lower price than risk-neutral bidders; some results obtained generalize the price-only auction theory, and some results are nearer to the reality relative to the previous corresponding results.