系统工程理论与实践
繫統工程理論與實踐
계통공정이론여실천
Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice
2014年
11期
2837~2848
,共null页
郝琳娜 侯文华 张李浩 刘猛
郝琳娜 侯文華 張李浩 劉猛
학림나 후문화 장리호 류맹
众包虚拟社区 惩罚机制 诚信保障机制 信誉评价机制 道德风险
衆包虛擬社區 懲罰機製 誠信保障機製 信譽評價機製 道德風險
음포허의사구 징벌궤제 성신보장궤제 신예평개궤제 도덕풍험
crowdsourcing virtual community; sanctioning mechanism; integrity safeguard mechanism;reputation evaluation mechanism; moral hazard
成员间的相互信任是众包虚拟社区持续稳定发展的重要保证.本文首先分析了各成员参与众包虚拟社区的动机,发现利益冲突会引起成员间欺诈现象的出现;然后运用长期利益大于短期收益的机理,在惩罚机制模型的基础上,增加了道德风险因素,运用博弈理论分别建立了诚信保障机制和信誉评价机制模型,以达到约束单方或双方欺诈行为,保障良好交易环境的目的;最后,比较了两种机制对众包虚拟社区成员各方收益的影响,结果表明:当解答者的努力水平确定时,解答者在诚信保障机制下的收益总是大于信誉评价机制下的收益,当申诉费用过高时,解答者在信誉评价机制下的收益总是大于诚信保障机制下的收益.并通过猪八戒网的案例分析,说明模型的有效性.
成員間的相互信任是衆包虛擬社區持續穩定髮展的重要保證.本文首先分析瞭各成員參與衆包虛擬社區的動機,髮現利益遲突會引起成員間欺詐現象的齣現;然後運用長期利益大于短期收益的機理,在懲罰機製模型的基礎上,增加瞭道德風險因素,運用博弈理論分彆建立瞭誠信保障機製和信譽評價機製模型,以達到約束單方或雙方欺詐行為,保障良好交易環境的目的;最後,比較瞭兩種機製對衆包虛擬社區成員各方收益的影響,結果錶明:噹解答者的努力水平確定時,解答者在誠信保障機製下的收益總是大于信譽評價機製下的收益,噹申訴費用過高時,解答者在信譽評價機製下的收益總是大于誠信保障機製下的收益.併通過豬八戒網的案例分析,說明模型的有效性.
성원간적상호신임시음포허의사구지속은정발전적중요보증.본문수선분석료각성원삼여음포허의사구적동궤,발현이익충돌회인기성원간기사현상적출현;연후운용장기이익대우단기수익적궤리,재징벌궤제모형적기출상,증가료도덕풍험인소,운용박혁이론분별건립료성신보장궤제화신예평개궤제모형,이체도약속단방혹쌍방기사행위,보장량호교역배경적목적;최후,비교료량충궤제대음포허의사구성원각방수익적영향,결과표명:당해답자적노력수평학정시,해답자재성신보장궤제하적수익총시대우신예평개궤제하적수익,당신소비용과고시,해답자재신예평개궤제하적수익총시대우성신보장궤제하적수익.병통과저팔계망적안례분석,설명모형적유효성.
If crowdsourcing wants to be developed steadily, the members are required to be involved in mutual trust and common progress with each other in the virtual community. Firstly, by analyzing the members' participation motivation and interest in virtual community, we spot the fraud motivation of participants. Secondly, based on the principle that long-term interests weigh more than short-term gains and the sanctioning mechanism model, and using the game theory method we establish game model of integrity safeguards mechanism and reputation evaluation mechanism respectively which under considering the moral hazard. The purpose is to employ the two mechanisms to constraint unilateral or bilateral fraud and to ensure good trading environment. Thirdly, through the two mechanisms comparative analysis, the study shows that the profits of solver are always greater in integrity safeguard mechanism than in reputation evaluation mechanism when the effort level of solver has been offered. However, the profits of solver are always greater in reputation evaluation mechanism than in integrity safeguard mechanism when the cost of appeals is too high. Finally, given the case analysis of "zhubajie", we illustrate the effectiveness of the model.