CAJ | 학술논문

本文对道德直觉的内涵、形成机制、加工判断机制进行评述后认为：（1）道德直觉作为社会直觉的一种，既有一般社会直觉的一些共性，又有其特殊性。（2）目前尚无充分证据支持道德直觉的先天论主张，而基于“进化一文化一身体”的具身隐喻理论可能是道德直觉形成的重要机制。（3）道德直觉判断与个体对道德情境中的情绪认知以及道德情绪背后的道德规则或信念有着重要联系。
본문대도덕직각적내함、형성궤제、가공판단궤제진행평술후인위：（1）도덕직각작위사회직각적일충，기유일반사회직각적일사공성，우유기특수성。（2）목전상무충분증거지지도덕직각적선천론주장，이기우“진화일문화일신체”적구신은유이론가능시도덕직각형성적중요궤제。（3）도덕직각판단여개체대도덕정경중적정서인지이급도덕정서배후적도덕규칙혹신념유착중요련계。
Moral intuition is an important concept in recent moral judgment research. This paper makes a comment on theoretical and empirical advancement over the last ten years through three quiries--What is moral intuition？ What is the underlying mechanism of formation of moral intuition？ Is moral intuition motivated by emotions or rules？ Based on extant literature, the authors suggest that there are several conceptual and theoretical problems with the existing literature. For the first question, some researchers argue that moral intuition is a special social intuition which emphasizes the key function of emotions. Neural cognitive researches have found that moral intuitions is related to the function of certain brain areas such as cingulate cortex, basal ganglia, lateral prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, orbito-frontal cortex, and the temporo-parietal junction. These brain areas are also associated with processing of re-evaluation of emotional stimuli, motives and intentions. In addition, the authors also analyzed the essential difference between moral intuition and moral heuristic, and argues that they are two different concepts, for that the former emphasizes the rapidity and integrity of processing, while the latter emphasizes the utilization of simple rules that based on small samples in the short-term memory. However, these essential differences between moral intuition and moral heuristic were ignored by researchers. For the second question, both the universal moral grammar framework （UMG）and the moral foundation theory （MFT） take moral intuition as innate and modularized. However, the greatest challenge the two theories faced is that the modular view and its classification are inconsistent with findings in contemporary neuroscience. Based on studies of embodied coguiton and morality, the authors argue that the embody-metaphor framework of morality with emphasis on the evolution, culture and individual experience may be a promising direction of the origin and formation of moral intuition. The embody-metaphor framework of morality, however, is in its infancy. There are at least two signficant thorical issues worthy of study. First, some moral related researches conducted under the embody-metaphor framework, but these interesting studies need to be intergated into theoretic arguments in order to explain moral psychology. Second, according to embody-metaphor framework, the abstracted moral concept maped or scaffolded from early sensorimotor experiences. How dose the process of mapping or scaffolding works is a focused research issue. For the third question, we argue that it is difficult to adjudicate whether moral intuition is mainly driven by emotions or by rules. But two points are worthy of noting. Firstly, studies of the classification of intuitions imply that moral intuition may have different subtypes accompanied by different mechanism of reformation and process. Secondly, recent researches suggest that moral intuition is closely related to the emotional cognition, especially to the emotional recognition and classification, conferring value from different emotion to moral agents.