CAJ | 학술논문

随着我国用水矛盾日益突出,流域上下游间用水关系和用水利益的平衡成为稳定区域经济社会发展的重要问题.研究完善流域政府间生态补偿机制,对促进我国流域水资源环境保护、协调流域用水主体用水关系、平衡流域用水利益矛盾具有重要意义.流域生态补偿涉及上游政府、下游政府等多个政府机关,上下游政府因存在经济社会和资源环境目标和利益上的不一致,甚至矛盾冲突,使流域上下游政府生态补偿具有典型的博弈特征.本文通过构建基于成本收益的博弈模型,系统研究我国上下游政府间生态补偿存在的问题、深层次原因及应对策略,为完善我国流域生态补偿机制,缓解流域水资源环境利用关系和平衡流域上下游政府用水利益提供科学依据.研究显示,流域上下游保护与补偿的博弈中,地方政府生态补偿的横向财政转移支付对流域上游水环境保护处于失效状态,必须通过地方政府间有约束力的协议及与中央纵向财政转移支付相结合的模式,实现生态补偿的最大效用.所以,完善流域生态补偿机制,应从流域整体利益出发,视情形将国家和地方政府作为共同的生态补偿主体,并通过流域地方政府间有约束力的生态补偿协议规范政府保护与补偿行为,以上游政府保护成本和下游政府收益为参照确定生态补偿标准和国家与地方政府生态补偿分担比例,完善生态补偿法律法规体系建设,推进我国流域生态补偿制度的顺利实施.
수착아국용수모순일익돌출,류역상하유간용수관계화용수이익적평형성위은정구역경제사회발전적중요문제.연구완선류역정부간생태보상궤제,대촉진아국류역수자원배경보호、협조류역용수주체용수관계、평형류역용수이익모순구유중요의의.류역생태보상섭급상유정부、하유정부등다개정부궤관,상하유정부인존재경제사회화자원배경목표화이익상적불일치,심지모순충돌,사류역상하유정부생태보상구유전형적박혁특정.본문통과구건기우성본수익적박혁모형,계통연구아국상하유정부간생태보상존재적문제、심층차원인급응대책략,위완선아국류역생태보상궤제,완해류역수자원배경이용관계화평형류역상하유정부용수이익제공과학의거.연구현시,류역상하유보호여보상적박혁중,지방정부생태보상적횡향재정전이지부대류역상유수배경보호처우실효상태,필수통과지방정부간유약속력적협의급여중앙종향재정전이지부상결합적모식,실현생태보상적최대효용.소이,완선류역생태보상궤제,응종류역정체이익출발,시정형장국가화지방정부작위공동적생태보상주체,병통과류역지방정부간유약속력적생태보상협의규범정부보호여보상행위,이상유정부보호성본화하유정부수익위삼조학정생태보상표준화국가여지방정부생태보상분담비례,완선생태보상법율법규체계건설,추진아국류역생태보상제도적순리실시.
The water resources utilization contradictions is becoming increasingly conspicuous in our country,and the water resources utilization relationship between upper stream and downstream and balance of the water interests in river basin has become an important issue concerning regional economic stability and social development.Study on the improvement of payments for environmental services in basin area is especially important in promoting protection of basin water resources,coordinating main water relations in basin area and balancing conflicts of water interests in basin area.River basin ecological compensation involves a complex system which consists of upper stream government,downstream government and other related government agencies,due to the conflicts in economical,social and environmental goals and interests between upper stream and downstream government,so the ecological compensation in river basin presents a typical Game feature.This paper,by constructing a game model based on cost-benefit analysis,systematically analyzed the problems,underlying causes and solutions of intergovernmental payments for environmental services in basin area in China in order to improve the river basin ecological compensation mechanism,to provide scientific basis to ease water utilization relationship and to balance water utilization interests between upper stream and downstream.Study shows that,in the game of protection and payments in upstream and downstream area,horizontal financial transfer payment to protect the upstream water environment in local government＇s payments for environmental services program displayed a failure status,so binding intergovernmental agreements and longitudinal central financial transfer payment should be combined together to achieve maximum effectiveness of payments for environmental services.Therefore,we should improve the payments for environmental services in basin area; from the interests of the whole basin area,the central government and local governments should be regarded as a common consumer depending on different situation; by binding intergovernmental agreements,the protection and payments of the government in basin area can be regulated ; according to the cost of upstream government and the benefit of downstream government,the standard and share proportion of payments for environmental services are set up ;finally,we should implement construction of legal system of payments for environmental services and promote the successful implementation of payments for environmental services.