CAJ | 학술논문

本文考虑一个风险中性的节能服务公司和一个风险规避的用能企业在节能成本上具有不对称信息，采用一个能源费用节约额的线性函数作为用能单位向节能服务公司的支付，建立了一个斯坦伯格博弈模型来研究节能服务外包合同的设计。研究发现最优合同是效益保证和效益共享两种形式的结合，即节能服务公司向用能单位支付一个保证的节约额，然后双方共同对最后实现的能源费用节约额进行分享，且保证节约额和节能服务公司的分享比例随节能服务公司的效率、节能绩效的不确定性和用能单位风险规避程度的增加而增加。
본문고필일개풍험중성적절능복무공사화일개풍험규피적용능기업재절능성본상구유불대칭신식，채용일개능원비용절약액적선성함수작위용능단위향절능복무공사적지부，건립료일개사탄백격박혁모형래연구절능복무외포합동적설계。연구발현최우합동시효익보증화효익공향량충형식적결합，즉절능복무공사향용능단위지부일개보증적절약액，연후쌍방공동대최후실현적능원비용절약액진행분향，차보증절약액화절능복무공사적분향비례수절능복무공사적효솔、절능적효적불학정성화용능단위풍험규피정도적증가이증가。
Information asymmetry on energy saving cost between a risk-neutral energy service company and a risk-averse client is taken into account. A linear function of the total realized energy savings is employed as the payment from the client to the company, and a Stackelberg game model is developed to design the optimal contract in energy service contracting. The research shows that the optimal contract integrates both guaranteed savings and shared savings, which means that the energy service company pays a guaranteed savings to the client and then the realized savings is shared by both parties. Moreover, both the guaranteed savings and the sharing proportion of the company from the total realized energy savings increase as the efficiency of the company, the uncertainty of the energy service performance and the degree of risk aversion of the client increase.