上海财经大学学报：哲学社会科学版
上海財經大學學報：哲學社會科學版
상해재경대학학보：철학사회과학판
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
2014年
6期
71~80
,共null页
薪酬委员会设立 薪酬业绩敏感度 相对业绩 市场化程度
薪酬委員會設立 薪酬業績敏感度 相對業績 市場化程度
신수위원회설립 신수업적민감도 상대업적 시장화정도
compensation committee; compensation-performance sensitivity, relative per- formance; marketization
薪酬委员会的目标之一是为上市公司制定良好的薪酬制度，使经理层与股东利益一致，从而提升公司价值。我国引入的薪酬委员会制度能实现该目标吗？文章选择2002--2006年上市公司自愿设立薪酬委员会作为研究样本，就有效契约论和经理人权力理论对薪酬委员会制度是否有助于提高公司薪酬业绩敏感度进行了理论阐释和实证检验。研究发现：（1）自愿设立薪酬委员会的上市公司的高管薪酬越高，薪酬业绩敏感度越低；（2）公司相对业绩水平会影响薪酬委员会的作用，尤其是相对业绩较差的公司，设立薪酬委员会显著降低了薪酬业绩敏感度；（3）市场化进程也会影响薪酬委员会的作用，市场化程度高（低）会显著增强（减弱）薪酬委员会设立对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响。研究结果表明，薪酬委员会制度的自愿设立更符合经理人权力理论，薪酬委员会的强制设立在短期内并未对提升高管薪酬业绩敏感度发挥作用。
薪酬委員會的目標之一是為上市公司製定良好的薪酬製度，使經理層與股東利益一緻，從而提升公司價值。我國引入的薪酬委員會製度能實現該目標嗎？文章選擇2002--2006年上市公司自願設立薪酬委員會作為研究樣本，就有效契約論和經理人權力理論對薪酬委員會製度是否有助于提高公司薪酬業績敏感度進行瞭理論闡釋和實證檢驗。研究髮現：（1）自願設立薪酬委員會的上市公司的高管薪酬越高，薪酬業績敏感度越低；（2）公司相對業績水平會影響薪酬委員會的作用，尤其是相對業績較差的公司，設立薪酬委員會顯著降低瞭薪酬業績敏感度；（3）市場化進程也會影響薪酬委員會的作用，市場化程度高（低）會顯著增彊（減弱）薪酬委員會設立對薪酬業績敏感度的影響。研究結果錶明，薪酬委員會製度的自願設立更符閤經理人權力理論，薪酬委員會的彊製設立在短期內併未對提升高管薪酬業績敏感度髮揮作用。
신수위원회적목표지일시위상시공사제정량호적신수제도，사경리층여고동이익일치，종이제승공사개치。아국인입적신수위원회제도능실현해목표마？문장선택2002--2006년상시공사자원설립신수위원회작위연구양본，취유효계약론화경리인권력이론대신수위원회제도시부유조우제고공사신수업적민감도진행료이론천석화실증검험。연구발현：（1）자원설립신수위원회적상시공사적고관신수월고，신수업적민감도월저；（2）공사상대업적수평회영향신수위원회적작용，우기시상대업적교차적공사，설립신수위원회현저강저료신수업적민감도；（3）시장화진정야회영향신수위원회적작용，시장화정도고（저）회현저증강（감약）신수위원회설립대신수업적민감도적영향。연구결과표명，신수위원회제도적자원설립경부합경리인권력이론，신수위원회적강제설립재단기내병미대제승고관신수업적민감도발휘작용。
A compensation committee is designed to formulate sound pay system for listed compa- nies and realize the interest consistency between managerial level and stockholders, thereby improving firm values. Will the compensation committee system in China help to realize the objective？ Based on a sample of listed companies with voluntary establishment of compensation committees from 2002 to 2006, this paper theoretically interprets and empirically tests the positive role of compensation committee sys- tem in compensation-performance sensitivity based on effective contract view and manager power theory. It arrives at the following conclusions： firstly, in listed companies with voluntary compensation commit- tees, executive compensation is higher and the compensation-performance sensitivity is lower; secondly, the relative performance affects the role of compensation committees, and especially in companies with poor relative performance, the establishment of compensation committees can significantly reduce the compensation-performance sensitivity; thirdly, marketization process also affects the role of compensa tion committees, namely high-degree/low-degree marketization can significantly strengthen/weaken the effect of the establishment of compensation committees shows that the voluntary establishment of compensation on the compensation-performance sensitivity. It committees is more in accordance with manager power theory and the compulsory establishment of compensation committees does not exert the role in the increase in the compensation-performance sensitivity in the short run.
