CAJ | 학술논문

基于我国银行部门的特殊制度背景，本文应用媒体治理理论考察媒体在我国银行风险治理中的角色，研究发现，在政府对媒体和银行存在双重控制的情况下，媒体监督在银行风险治理中遭遇了严重的困境。具体而言，在政绩诉求的驱动下，地方政府需要利用银行信贷资源维持投资驱动模式下的GDP增长，从而扭曲了信贷资源配置效率。所以，当银行的风险越大时，地方政府或银行自身越可能调动或游说媒体加强对银行的正面宣传，以吸引更多的社会资金，使其投资驱动的地方经济增长模式得以维持；并且，在金融市场化程度低、政绩诉求高以及银行是国有属性的情况下，这种现象更为明显。本文既能为我国银行改善风险治理提供政策参考，又能丰富我们对媒体治理的理解。
기우아국은행부문적특수제도배경，본문응용매체치리이론고찰매체재아국은행풍험치리중적각색，연구발현，재정부대매체화은행존재쌍중공제적정황하，매체감독재은행풍험치리중조우료엄중적곤경。구체이언，재정적소구적구동하，지방정부수요이용은행신대자원유지투자구동모식하적GDP증장，종이뉴곡료신대자원배치효솔。소이，당은행적풍험월대시，지방정부혹은행자신월가능조동혹유설매체가강대은행적정면선전，이흡인경다적사회자금，사기투자구동적지방경제증장모식득이유지；병차，재금융시장화정도저、정적소구고이급은행시국유속성적정황하，저충현상경위명현。본문기능위아국은행개선풍험치리제공정책삼고，우능봉부아문대매체치리적리해。
Based on the unique institutional background of China＇ s banking sector, this paper investigates the role of media in the bank risk governance of China with the theory of media governance. This study finds that when the media and the bank have been both controlled by the government, the government or bank will intervene and affect the independence of media, which will severely weaken the monitoring role of media in bank risk governance. Specifically, with the investment-driven economic mode, the political achievement demands of local government make them reply on the banks＇ credit resources to keep the GDP growth, which has distorted the efficiency of credit resources allocation. As a result, when the bank confronts more risk, to attract more social capital and maintain the local economic growth with the investment-driven economic mode, the local government or bank will more inclined to arouse the media to expand reports about the local commercial banks. And this is more obvious when the financial liberalization is less developed, the political achievement demands are stronger, or the bank is state-owned. This study can provide policy reference value on improving bank risk governance, and helps us to a better understand about media governance.