CAJ | 학술논문

考虑一个处于强势地位的销售商与一个拥有私人成本信息的供应商组成的二级供应链。基于不知情销售商的视角,建立了能够真实揭示供应商生产成本信息的逆向选择模型,并对最优赊销契约机制的特征进行了分析。结果表明：为了诱导供应商真实报告自身信息,高效率供应商获得了额外的信息租金;为减少该信息租金,销售商提供给低效率供应商的最优赊销契约存在扭曲,且扭曲程度与两类供应商生产成本的差距以及销售商对高效率供应商的事前信念有关。
고필일개처우강세지위적소수상여일개옹유사인성본신식적공응상조성적이급공응련。기우불지정소수상적시각,건립료능구진실게시공응상생산성본신식적역향선택모형,병대최우사소계약궤제적특정진행료분석。결과표명：위료유도공응상진실보고자신신식,고효솔공응상획득료액외적신식조금;위감소해신식조금,소수상제공급저효솔공응상적최우사소계약존재뉴곡,차뉴곡정도여량류공응상생산성본적차거이급소수상대고효솔공응상적사전신념유관。
A supply chain consists of a retailer who is the core enterprise and a supplier who has private information of the production cost was considered. To solve the problem of information revealing,this paper proposed an adverse selection model,and then characterized the optimal trade credit contracts. The results shows that,to reveal the supplier＇s actual cost,the efficient supplier can get some information rent. However,to decrease the supplier＇s information rent,the retailer is ready to accept downward output distortion for the inefficient supplier. And moreover,the distortion is affected by the spread of uncertainty on the supplier＇s production cost,as well as the retailer＇s ex-ante belief.