系统工程理论与实践
繫統工程理論與實踐
계통공정이론여실천
Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice
2014年
12期
3091~3102
,共null页
独立董事 网络位置 公司违规 社会网络 公司治理
獨立董事 網絡位置 公司違規 社會網絡 公司治理
독립동사 망락위치 공사위규 사회망락 공사치리
independent directors; network position; corporate violation of rules; social networks; corpo-rate governance
基于社会网络视角研究独立董事治理功能是公司治理研究的最新发展领域.本文采用部分可观测Bivariate Probit模型,实证研究了中国上市公司独立董事网络位置对公司违规行为的影响.丰富的网络关系有助于独立董事掌握更多的社会资本,提高其监督动机和监督能力,从而有效抑制上市公司违规行为.实证检验发现,独立董事网络中心度与上市公司违规倾向呈显著负相关关系,表明独立董事网络对其监督职能的发挥存在促进作用.补充检验发现,独立董事网络的监督促进作用主要体现在制约信息披露违规方面,在非信息披露违规方面作用不明显;将独立董事区分为审计委员会成员和非审计委员会成员后,发现仅有担任审计委员会成员的独立董事的网络关系才具有显著的监督促进作用;独立董事网络的监督促进作用在盈利性较差的公司中表现更为明显.研究结果丰富了独立董事、董事网络和上市公司违规的研究成果.
基于社會網絡視角研究獨立董事治理功能是公司治理研究的最新髮展領域.本文採用部分可觀測Bivariate Probit模型,實證研究瞭中國上市公司獨立董事網絡位置對公司違規行為的影響.豐富的網絡關繫有助于獨立董事掌握更多的社會資本,提高其鑑督動機和鑑督能力,從而有效抑製上市公司違規行為.實證檢驗髮現,獨立董事網絡中心度與上市公司違規傾嚮呈顯著負相關關繫,錶明獨立董事網絡對其鑑督職能的髮揮存在促進作用.補充檢驗髮現,獨立董事網絡的鑑督促進作用主要體現在製約信息披露違規方麵,在非信息披露違規方麵作用不明顯;將獨立董事區分為審計委員會成員和非審計委員會成員後,髮現僅有擔任審計委員會成員的獨立董事的網絡關繫纔具有顯著的鑑督促進作用;獨立董事網絡的鑑督促進作用在盈利性較差的公司中錶現更為明顯.研究結果豐富瞭獨立董事、董事網絡和上市公司違規的研究成果.
기우사회망락시각연구독립동사치리공능시공사치리연구적최신발전영역.본문채용부분가관측Bivariate Probit모형,실증연구료중국상시공사독립동사망락위치대공사위규행위적영향.봉부적망락관계유조우독립동사장악경다적사회자본,제고기감독동궤화감독능력,종이유효억제상시공사위규행위.실증검험발현,독립동사망락중심도여상시공사위규경향정현저부상관관계,표명독립동사망락대기감독직능적발휘존재촉진작용.보충검험발현,독립동사망락적감독촉진작용주요체현재제약신식피로위규방면,재비신식피로위규방면작용불명현;장독립동사구분위심계위원회성원화비심계위원회성원후,발현부유담임심계위원회성원적독립동사적망락관계재구유현저적감독촉진작용;독립동사망락적감독촉진작용재영리성교차적공사중표현경위명현.연구결과봉부료독립동사、동사망락화상시공사위규적연구성과.
Researching the governance role of independent directors on the network view is an updated field of corporate governance. Using the Bivariate Probit model, this study investigates the influence of network position of independent directors on corporate violation of rules. Independent directors with rich network relationships can possess more social capital to improve their motivation and ability of monitoring, which will reduce the possibility of corporate violation of rules. Consistent with theoretical analysis, the result shows that the network centrality of independent directors has significantly negative relationship with the propensity of corporate violation of rules. The study reveals that network of independent directors has positive influence on their monitoring roles. The complementary tests show that the active effect of independent director networks exists in the aspect of information disclosure fraud, but not in the aspect of other kinds of fraud; networks of independent directors entering audit committees have active effect, but others have not; the active effect of independent director networks is more significant in firms with worse profitability. This paper complements the literature of independent directors, board networks and corporate violation of rules.
