CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过个体和整体两种视角,采用博弈分析方法,考察了纳什均衡条件与帕累托均衡条件下社会碳排放总量与碳减排总量的差异,探讨了碳排放过量的根源以及空气资源利用的效率问题问题,认为：空气严重污染的经济根源在于清洁空气是一种无法界定产权的公共资源;社会总的实际净排放量大于帕累托均衡状态下社会总的净排放量;社会碳排放量过多是多主体对清洁空气消费行为博弈的必然结果,而社会碳减排总量不足是多主体对空气污染治理行为博弈的必然结果。这些都为低碳经济机制设计和制度安排提供了理论依据。
본문통과개체화정체량충시각,채용박혁분석방법,고찰료납십균형조건여파루탁균형조건하사회탄배방총량여탄감배총량적차이,탐토료탄배방과량적근원이급공기자원이용적효솔문제문제,인위：공기엄중오염적경제근원재우청길공기시일충무법계정산권적공공자원;사회총적실제정배방량대우파루탁균형상태하사회총적정배방량;사회탄배방량과다시다주체대청길공기소비행위박혁적필연결과,이사회탄감배총량불족시다주체대공기오염치리행위박혁적필연결과。저사도위저탄경제궤제설계화제도안배제공료이론의거。
In this paper, the author has analyzed the differences between the aggregate carbon emissions and the aggregate carbon reductions under the Nash equilibrium and those under the Pareto equilibrium, and discussed the root of excessive carbon emissions and the problem about the use efficiency of air resources, from the individual and whole perspectives, by using the game analysis. This paper believes that the economic source of serious air pollution is that clear air is a kind of public resources whose property rights can＇ t be defined, the total social net emissions are greater than those under the Pareto equilibrium, and excessive total social carbon emissions are the inevitable results of the multi - agent game around the consumption behavior of the clear air, whereas insufficient total social carbon emission reductions are the inevitable results of the multi -agent game around the governance behavior of the polluted air. The paper will provide us the theoretical basis for economic mechanism design and institutional arrangement of the low carbon economy.