CAJ | 학술논문

2005年股权分置改革以来来,部部分非流通股转为流通股,有关股权激励制度负面效应的研究越来越多,但是并未系统全面地分析股权激励公司中可能存在的经理人择机行为行为。文章从阐述经理人牟利动机出发出发,通过动态贝叶斯纳什均衡分析股权激励制度原理所引发的经理人行为动机,结合市场调整模型实证检验股权激励公司中压低行权价或授予价的现象现象,并比较分析激励类型、公司性质对这种择机行为的影响程度,从股权激励计划要素、环境等方面提出针对性建议,以期为完善公司股权激励提供一定的借鉴。
2005년고권분치개혁이래래,부부분비류통고전위류통고,유관고권격려제도부면효응적연구월래월다,단시병미계통전면지분석고권격려공사중가능존재적경리인택궤행위행위。문장종천술경리인모리동궤출발출발,통과동태패협사납십균형분석고권격려제도원리소인발적경리인행위동궤,결합시장조정모형실증검험고권격려공사중압저행권개혹수여개적현상현상,병비교분석격려류형、공사성질대저충택궤행위적영향정도,종고권격려계화요소、배경등방면제출침대성건의,이기위완선공사고권격려제공일정적차감。
Since the reform of split share structure in 2005, a part of non - tradeable shares have been turned into tradable shares, more and more researches have focused on negative effects, but was not comprehensive analysis of manager opportunism behavior from the exercise price which may exist in the equity incentive companies. The article started from the managers＇ profit motives through the dynamic analysis of Bias Nash equilibrium, which analyzed equity incentive manager behaviors caused by system theory and combined the market adjustment model to make an empirical test of medium low exercise price or grant price of equity incentive companies. It compared influence of the opportunistic behavior under different motivation types, the nature of the company, and provided some references for equity incentive corporate governance from the equity incentive plan factor, environment and other aspects of recommendations.