CAJ | 학술논문

中国经济发展的奇迹在于理顺了中央政府、地方官员以及企业三者之间的关系。本文在稳定子博弈完美均衡的委托代理框架下，抓住政治集权、经济分权的特征，考察了中央与地方官员之间的博弈行动，将地方官员发展经济的行为模型化。地方经济发展本身面临不确定性，其发展绩效较大程度上取决于地方官员的努力程度，发展收益在政府和企业间的分配取决于地方官员的清廉程度，而地方官员的努力程度和清廉程度均取决于中央提供委托代理合约的具体特征。研究发现，中央能够对地方官员设置合理的政治激励与经济报酬激励，以获得高政治支持，进而促进地方经济发展与经济收益的合理分配，增进经济增长与和谐共融。
중국경제발전적기적재우리순료중앙정부、지방관원이급기업삼자지간적관계。본문재은정자박혁완미균형적위탁대리광가하，조주정치집권、경제분권적특정，고찰료중앙여지방관원지간적박혁행동，장지방관원발전경제적행위모형화。지방경제발전본신면림불학정성，기발전적효교대정도상취결우지방관원적노력정도，발전수익재정부화기업간적분배취결우지방관원적청렴정도，이지방관원적노력정도화청렴정도균취결우중앙제공위탁대리합약적구체특정。연구발현，중앙능구대지방관원설치합리적정치격려여경제보수격려，이획득고정치지지，진이촉진지방경제발전여경제수익적합리분배，증진경제증장여화해공융。
China economic development miracle is to straighten out the relationship between the central government, local officials and enterprise of the three. In this paper, stability in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the principal- agent framework, seize the political centralization, economic decentralization characteristic, investigates the game action between the central and local officials, local officials of behavioral models of economic development. The development of the local economy itself is faced with uncertainty, the degree of effort to its development mainly depends on the performance of local officials, the distribution of income in the development between government and enterprise depends on local officials clean degree, and the specific characteristics of the principalagent contract effort of local officials and clean degree depends on the central provided by. This paper found that, the central to set reasonable political incentives and economic returns of incentives to local officials, to obtain a high political support, and promote the rational allocation of local economic development and economic benefits, promote economic growth and harmony.