CAJ | 학술논문

以我国强制性业绩预告制度为背景，检验审计师是否考虑业绩预告信息所传递的风险信号，调整审计投入，从而进一步甄别盈余质量。结论发现：业绩预告信息作为审计师重要的风险评估来源之一，可以有效地抑制发布坏消息公司的高盈余管理水平，减少其重述行为；而对好消息公司，审计费用与高盈余管理行为、年报重述均呈显著正相关，说明业绩预告好消息公司将年报重述作为其盈余管理手段，并未因审计投入的增加而减少。
이아국강제성업적예고제도위배경，검험심계사시부고필업적예고신식소전체적풍험신호，조정심계투입，종이진일보견별영여질량。결론발현：업적예고신식작위심계사중요적풍험평고래원지일，가이유효지억제발포배소식공사적고영여관리수평，감소기중술행위；이대호소식공사，심계비용여고영여관리행위、년보중술균정현저정상관，설명업적예고호소식공사장년보중술작위기영여관리수단，병미인심계투입적증가이감소。
The objective of this paper is to examine the relation between audit fees and disclosure of earnings forecasts issued by managers. Although there is an extensive literature on voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of re- search on how auditors incorporate information from mandated disclosures in China. Among these firms that issue earn- ings forecasts, we can find that the levd of earuings management on the issuance of bad news is positively associated with the current period audit fees. But the reverse is not true for good news, indicating that auditors do not view these firms risky. Further, in the forecasts for bad news＇ forecasts but not for good news＇ forecasts, abnormal audit fees to be negatively associated with and restatement. Overall, the results show that auditor captures higher business risk via man- agement＇ s forecast behavior, then adjusts auditing resource and improves audit quality of bad news＇ firms.