当代经济管理
噹代經濟管理
당대경제관리
Contemporary Economic Management
2015年
3期
94~97
,共null页
高管集权 代理理论 股利政策 基金持股
高管集權 代理理論 股利政策 基金持股
고관집권 대리이론 고리정책 기금지고
high concentration of managerial power; agency theory ; cash dividends ; fund shareholding
上市公司不分红或少分红一直是我国资本市场治理的热点和难点问题。文章以沪深A股上市公司2008-2012年数据为样本进行实证研究，结果发现高管集权与上市公司不分红或少分红显著相关，而基金持股可以促进上市公司的现金分红，抑刺高管集权产生的代理问题。
上市公司不分紅或少分紅一直是我國資本市場治理的熱點和難點問題。文章以滬深A股上市公司2008-2012年數據為樣本進行實證研究，結果髮現高管集權與上市公司不分紅或少分紅顯著相關，而基金持股可以促進上市公司的現金分紅，抑刺高管集權產生的代理問題。
상시공사불분홍혹소분홍일직시아국자본시장치리적열점화난점문제。문장이호심A고상시공사2008-2012년수거위양본진행실증연구，결과발현고관집권여상시공사불분홍혹소분홍현저상관，이기금지고가이촉진상시공사적현금분홍，억자고관집권산생적대리문제。
It has been a hot and difficult governance problem of Chinese capital market that listed companies do not pay or pay less cash dividends. This paper chooses A-share listed companies as samples from 2008 to 2012 and tests that there is high significant correlation between no paying or paying less cash dividends and high concentration of executive power, Fund shareholding can promote increasing cash dividends, and weaken agency problem from internal control defects. It has a certain reference value to standardize deficiencies of listed companies＇ dividend policy and improve the level of corporate governance.
