企业经济
企業經濟
기업경제
Enterprise Economy
2015年
1期
185~188
,共null页
供应链金融 回购定价 Nash协商模型
供應鏈金融 迴購定價 Nash協商模型
공응련금융 회구정개 Nash협상모형
supply chain finance; buyback pricing; Nash negotiation model
通过回购契约机制促使零售商和银行开展存货质押融资业务是供应链金融常见的模式之一。传统的Stackelberg主从博弈方法研究表明,银行和零售商的预期收益是关于回购率的增函数,供应商的预期收益是关于回购率的减函数,且参与方的最优回购定价是以银行和零售商占主导地位制定的,这使得位于从属地位和信息末端的供应商必须制定满足银行和零售商的最优定价但不符合参与合作个体理性的原则。因此,应构建Nash协商下的回购契约机制模型。研究表明,该模型下的回购定价,能使供应商遵循激励和理性原则,同时参与者的谈判和议价能力能达到协商均衡。
通過迴購契約機製促使零售商和銀行開展存貨質押融資業務是供應鏈金融常見的模式之一。傳統的Stackelberg主從博弈方法研究錶明,銀行和零售商的預期收益是關于迴購率的增函數,供應商的預期收益是關于迴購率的減函數,且參與方的最優迴購定價是以銀行和零售商佔主導地位製定的,這使得位于從屬地位和信息末耑的供應商必鬚製定滿足銀行和零售商的最優定價但不符閤參與閤作箇體理性的原則。因此,應構建Nash協商下的迴購契約機製模型。研究錶明,該模型下的迴購定價,能使供應商遵循激勵和理性原則,同時參與者的談判和議價能力能達到協商均衡。
통과회구계약궤제촉사령수상화은행개전존화질압융자업무시공응련금융상견적모식지일。전통적Stackelberg주종박혁방법연구표명,은행화령수상적예기수익시관우회구솔적증함수,공응상적예기수익시관우회구솔적감함수,차삼여방적최우회구정개시이은행화령수상점주도지위제정적,저사득위우종속지위화신식말단적공응상필수제정만족은행화령수상적최우정개단불부합삼여합작개체이성적원칙。인차,응구건Nash협상하적회구계약궤제모형。연구표명,해모형하적회구정개,능사공응상준순격려화이성원칙,동시삼여자적담판화의개능력능체도협상균형。
As one of the common models of supply chain finance, the buyback contract mechanism is used to encourage retailers and banks to carry out inventory financing business. Traditional Stackelberg master - slave game method shows that expected in- comes of banks and retailers are increasing functions of buyback rate, the supplier＇ s expected profit is the reducing function of buyback rate, and the participant＇ s optimal buyback pricing is based on banks and retailers, which makes suppliers lo- cated in the subordinated position. In the end the suppliers must make the optimal pricing for the banks and retailers, but this does not conform to the principle of cooperative individual rationality. Therefore the Nash negotiation buyback contract mechanism must be constructed. The study indicates that the buyback pricing can make suppliers follow the incentive and rational principle and at the same time make the participants＇ bargaining power reach the negotiation equilibrium.
