CAJ | 학술논문

文章认为，当供应商对项目的成本信息有更多的了解，且在成本削减方面进行了投资时，会计数据在规制契约或政府采购契约中的运用便显得尤为重要。文章的主要结论是，在风险中性的假设下，供应商给出一个预期成本，便可以得到一个在成本超支方面具有线性性质的激励契约。随着供应商给出的预期成本的减小，固定价格契约将成为最优契约。此外，文章还对技术选择和收益率规制机制的使用等问题进行了研究。
문장인위，당공응상대항목적성본신식유경다적료해，차재성본삭감방면진행료투자시，회계수거재규제계약혹정부채구계약중적운용편현득우위중요。문장적주요결론시，재풍험중성적가설하，공응상급출일개예기성본，편가이득도일개재성본초지방면구유선성성질적격려계약。수착공응상급출적예기성본적감소，고정개격계약장성위최우계약。차외，문장환대기술선택화수익솔규제궤제적사용등문제진행료연구。
The paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier （ 1 ） has superior information about the cost of the project and （2） invests in cost reduction. The main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns. This （optimal） contract moves toward a fixed - price contract as the announced cost decreases. An investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate - of - return regulation is studied.