CAJ | 학술논문

以2007-2011年A股非金融保险业上市公司为样本，从政治关联与审计契约角度揭示独立董事与其他高管在公司治理中的差异。研究发现：在审计师选择方面，独立董事存在政治关联的企业倾向于选择高质量的审计服务，其他高管存在政治关联的企业倾向于选择低质量的审计服务。结合对审计费用考察发现，其他高管存在政治关联的企业选择较低质量审计服务的同时却支付相对较高的审计费用，但又并没有支付显著高于独立董事存在政治关联的企业选择高质量审计服务时支付的审计费用。
이2007-2011년A고비금융보험업상시공사위양본，종정치관련여심계계약각도게시독립동사여기타고관재공사치리중적차이。연구발현：재심계사선택방면，독립동사존재정치관련적기업경향우선택고질량적심계복무，기타고관존재정치관련적기업경향우선택저질량적심계복무。결합대심계비용고찰발현，기타고관존재정치관련적기업선택교저질량심계복무적동시각지부상대교고적심계비용，단우병몰유지부현저고우독립동사존재정치관련적기업선택고질량심계복무시지부적심계비용。
By using 2007-2011 A-share listed non-financial insurance industry as a sample, we divide the political connec- tions into different types of independent directors political connections and other executives political connections according to the types of executives and find the different role of corporate governance between the independent directors and the other exec- utives from the perspective of political connections and the audit contract. We show that companies with independent director political connections tend to choose high-quality audit services, and companies with other executive political connections tend to choose low-quality audit services. We also show that companies with other executive political connections tend to choose a lower-quality audit services but pay relatively higher audit fees, and do not pay significantly higher than the companies with in- dependent director political connections. Therefore, the study indicates that independent directors tend to use “supporting hand” of political connections to play a role in corporate governance while other executives tend to use the “grabbing hand”.