CAJ | 학술논문

商业银行股权结构竞争均衡的核心是控制权争夺。拥有控制权的一方不仅能获得银行价值增值所带来的投资收益，还可能获得各种非投资收益，这些由控制权带来的、超过投资收益的各类收益就是“控制权收益”。本文通过构建控制权收益模型能较好地解释现实中银行股权结构的竞争均衡，结果发现监管者可以通过控制对小股东的“制裁成本”来影响其在具有竞争力差异的国外战略投资者和国有大股东之间的选择，并在此基础上提出以国外战略投资者参与为代表的多利益主体对控制权收益的竞争，不会降低股份制银行的价值。
상업은행고권결구경쟁균형적핵심시공제권쟁탈。옹유공제권적일방불부능획득은행개치증치소대래적투자수익，환가능획득각충비투자수익，저사유공제권대래적、초과투자수익적각류수익취시“공제권수익”。본문통과구건공제권수익모형능교호지해석현실중은행고권결구적경쟁균형，결과발현감관자가이통과공제대소고동적“제재성본”래영향기재구유경쟁력차이적국외전략투자자화국유대고동지간적선택，병재차기출상제출이국외전략투자자삼여위대표적다이익주체대공제권수익적경쟁，불회강저고빈제은행적개치。
To competing for the continUing stake is the core of the competitive equilibrium ownership structure of commercial banks. The party who has the controlling stake will not only get the investment income brought about by the bank value added, may also get a variety of non-investment income. All the non- investment income which come from the controlling stake is considered to be the benefits of control. This article can explain the competitive equilibrium analysis of bank ownership structure effectively by using the benefits of control model and draw the conclusion that the supervisor can affect minority shareholder＇ s choice between the large state - owned shareholders and the strategic investors by Controlling sanctions costs, and then pointed out that the intro- duction of strategic investors to the multi- stakeholder will not reduce the value of the bank.