中国人口资源与环境
中國人口資源與環境
중국인구자원여배경
China Polulation.Resources and Environment
2015年
1期
112~119
,共null页
农地整理 地方政府 村干部 委托代理 共同代理
農地整理 地方政府 村榦部 委託代理 共同代理
농지정리 지방정부 촌간부 위탁대리 공동대리
land consolidation; local government; village cadres; principal-agent; common agency
农地整理有利于提高农业生产率,是优化配置土地资源的重要手段,但我国的农地整理效率亟待提高。在农地整理项目实施中,村组干部是地方政府与农民的共同代理人。本文运用共同代理模型从理论上进行推演,认为在委托人利益目标一致的前提下,委托代理双方利益达到次优均衡;而当委托人利益目标发生背离时,共同代理人的行为出现偏差,农地整理项目的效率降低。并通过多元定序变量回归分析,基于湖北省调查数据证明该理论推导。研究结果显示,影响农民评价农地整理工程质量的主要因素是农民身份、项目的规划设计与施工质量、农民的农地整理参与程度及对地方政府的信任程度。研究结果说明,地方政府与农民在农地整理中的利益目标不一致.属于异质的委托人,且两者地位悬殊,地方政府属于强势委托人,而农民则是弱势委托人。作为共同代理人的村组干部在利益抉择中会选择与强势的地方政府合作,并进行利益合谋,最终导致农地整理工程质量低下。研究缩论如下:①打破现有农地整理中的共同代瑗关系,促使地方政府转变职能,强化其代理服务意识,与农民组成利益一致的同质委托人,避免共同代理人与强势委托人的利益共谋,从两提高委托代理效率。②构建完善的农民参与体系,激发农民的参与热情。并将农民的有效参与作为农地整理后评价的重要指标,促进地方政府履行应有职责。④建立健全农地整理项目的社会监督制度,尤其是强化项目区农民的社会监督力量。有利于显化代理人投入和行为,减少道德风险。提高农地整理效率。
農地整理有利于提高農業生產率,是優化配置土地資源的重要手段,但我國的農地整理效率亟待提高。在農地整理項目實施中,村組榦部是地方政府與農民的共同代理人。本文運用共同代理模型從理論上進行推縯,認為在委託人利益目標一緻的前提下,委託代理雙方利益達到次優均衡;而噹委託人利益目標髮生揹離時,共同代理人的行為齣現偏差,農地整理項目的效率降低。併通過多元定序變量迴歸分析,基于湖北省調查數據證明該理論推導。研究結果顯示,影響農民評價農地整理工程質量的主要因素是農民身份、項目的規劃設計與施工質量、農民的農地整理參與程度及對地方政府的信任程度。研究結果說明,地方政府與農民在農地整理中的利益目標不一緻.屬于異質的委託人,且兩者地位懸殊,地方政府屬于彊勢委託人,而農民則是弱勢委託人。作為共同代理人的村組榦部在利益抉擇中會選擇與彊勢的地方政府閤作,併進行利益閤謀,最終導緻農地整理工程質量低下。研究縮論如下:①打破現有農地整理中的共同代瑗關繫,促使地方政府轉變職能,彊化其代理服務意識,與農民組成利益一緻的同質委託人,避免共同代理人與彊勢委託人的利益共謀,從兩提高委託代理效率。②構建完善的農民參與體繫,激髮農民的參與熱情。併將農民的有效參與作為農地整理後評價的重要指標,促進地方政府履行應有職責。④建立健全農地整理項目的社會鑑督製度,尤其是彊化項目區農民的社會鑑督力量。有利于顯化代理人投入和行為,減少道德風險。提高農地整理效率。
농지정리유리우제고농업생산솔,시우화배치토지자원적중요수단,단아국적농지정리효솔극대제고。재농지정리항목실시중,촌조간부시지방정부여농민적공동대리인。본문운용공동대리모형종이론상진행추연,인위재위탁인이익목표일치적전제하,위탁대리쌍방이익체도차우균형;이당위탁인이익목표발생배리시,공동대리인적행위출현편차,농지정리항목적효솔강저。병통과다원정서변량회귀분석,기우호북성조사수거증명해이론추도。연구결과현시,영향농민평개농지정리공정질량적주요인소시농민신빈、항목적규화설계여시공질량、농민적농지정리삼여정도급대지방정부적신임정도。연구결과설명,지방정부여농민재농지정리중적이익목표불일치.속우이질적위탁인,차량자지위현수,지방정부속우강세위탁인,이농민칙시약세위탁인。작위공동대리인적촌조간부재이익결택중회선택여강세적지방정부합작,병진행이익합모,최종도치농지정리공정질량저하。연구축론여하:①타파현유농지정리중적공동대원관계,촉사지방정부전변직능,강화기대리복무의식,여농민조성이익일치적동질위탁인,피면공동대리인여강세위탁인적이익공모,종량제고위탁대리효솔。②구건완선적농민삼여체계,격발농민적삼여열정。병장농민적유효삼여작위농지정리후평개적중요지표,촉진지방정부리행응유직책。④건립건전농지정리항목적사회감독제도,우기시강화항목구농민적사회감독역량。유리우현화대리인투입화행위,감소도덕풍험。제고농지정리효솔。
Land consolidation is beneficial to increase agricultural productivity and optimize the allocation of land resources, but is of great importance to improve the efficiency of land consolidation in China. In the land consolidation project implementation, village officials are common agents of local government and farmers. In this paper, a co-agent model theoretically deduces that agency interests of both sides will reach a suboptimal equilibrium in a premise of the consistent principals interests; while the principal interest objectives are inconsistent with each other, there will be a common agent behavior deviations, and the efficiency of land consolidation project is reduced. According to the survey data of Hubei Province, the inference is confirmed by means of multiple sequencing variable regression analysis. The research showed that the main factors affecting farmers' evaluation of the quality of land consolidation project is farmer identity, planning, design and construction quality of the project, the participation of farmers in land consolidation and the trust in local government. The results demonstrates that common agent, village officials and strong client (the local government) crave for interest collusion, on account of the position disparity and conflict between the heterogeneous principal, local government and farmers, resulting in poor quality of the land consolidation project. Conclusions are as follows: ① The existing common agency relationship should be broken, which is conducive to the transformation of government functions and the strength of its agent consciousness. Meanwhile Local government and farmers, who share common interest, turn into homogeneous principals in order to avoid complicity with strong principals and improve the efficiency of the agency. ② A comprehensive system of farmer participation should be built to stimulate farmers' enthusiasm, and the effective participation of farmers should be as an important evaluation indicator of land consolidation to promote local government to fulfill its responsibilities. ③A sound social supervision system of land consolidation project should be established, in particular to strengthen the power of social supervision of farmers in the project area, which is conducive to clarity the agent inputs, to reduce moral hazard and improve the efficiency of land consolidation.