北华大学学报:社会科学版
北華大學學報:社會科學版
북화대학학보:사회과학판
Journal of Beihua University(Social Sciences)
2015年
1期
110~114
,共null页
中国加入TPP 谈判博弈 图模型
中國加入TPP 談判博弈 圖模型
중국가입TPP 담판박혁 도모형
China' s joining in TPP ; game analysis of negotiation ; graph model
文章从中国是否加入TPP谈判出发,以博弈论的视角,根据不同决策者的态度,将其分为中国、美国和越南三方,运用图模型的方法分析中国加入TPP谈判时的博弈问题。结论:(1)越南的态度不会改变最终的均衡状态,但对均衡形式有一定的影响;(2)美国的态度在中国申请加入TPP谈判中起决定性作用;(3)中国不仅要继续推进东亚合作,也应积极申请加入TPP谈判。建议:(1)对内全面深化改革,坚持对外开放;(2)对外积极保持沟通,继续加强合作。
文章從中國是否加入TPP談判齣髮,以博弈論的視角,根據不同決策者的態度,將其分為中國、美國和越南三方,運用圖模型的方法分析中國加入TPP談判時的博弈問題。結論:(1)越南的態度不會改變最終的均衡狀態,但對均衡形式有一定的影響;(2)美國的態度在中國申請加入TPP談判中起決定性作用;(3)中國不僅要繼續推進東亞閤作,也應積極申請加入TPP談判。建議:(1)對內全麵深化改革,堅持對外開放;(2)對外積極保持溝通,繼續加彊閤作。
문장종중국시부가입TPP담판출발,이박혁론적시각,근거불동결책자적태도,장기분위중국、미국화월남삼방,운용도모형적방법분석중국가입TPP담판시적박혁문제。결론:(1)월남적태도불회개변최종적균형상태,단대균형형식유일정적영향;(2)미국적태도재중국신청가입TPP담판중기결정성작용;(3)중국불부요계속추진동아합작,야응적겁신청가입TPP담판。건의:(1)대내전면심화개혁,견지대외개방;(2)대외적겁보지구통,계속가강합작。
Starting from whether China will join in TPP, according to different attitudes to China' s application, the paper divides decision makers into China, America and Vietnam in the view of game theory. Then, this article analyzes game problems with Graph Model once China reaches negotiation for joining TPP. It concludes as fol- lows : ( 1 ) Vietnam' s attitude won' t make a huge change to the final equilibrium state, but it does affect equilibri- um progress. (2) American attitude plays a vital role in negotiation for China' s application. ( 3 ) China not only needs to promote cooperation in East Asia, but also takes an active attitude to join TPP. As a result, the article suggests : ( 1 ) China ought to comprehensively deepen reform and opening up in domestic market. (2) Except keep efficient communication with different countries, Chinese government should strengthen closer cooperation in for- eign market.