审计研究
審計研究
심계연구
Audit Research
2015年
1期
84~90
,共null页
审计师 客户高管 旋转门现象 审计质量
審計師 客戶高管 鏇轉門現象 審計質量
심계사 객호고관 선전문현상 심계질량
auditor, client executive, revolving-door practice, audit quality
除了个案研究,以往基于大样本的经验研究并未发现审计师在成为客户高管前对未来雇主实施了更加宽松的审计,这似乎意味着普遍而言,从审计师成为客户高管的旋转门现象并不存在有损于实际审计质量的前因。本文发现,当按以往文献的做法不区分跳槽审计师是否负责未来雇主的审计业务时,我们得到与以往文献类似的结果;而一旦作出区分后,则发现当跳槽审计师负责未来雇主的审计时,未来雇主当年的财务报表伴随着更高的盈余管理(尤其是调增利润的盈余管理)。我们还发现,跳槽审计师的宽松审计态度仅体现在对待未来雇主上,而没有体现在自己负责的其他审计客户上;跳槽审计师对未来雇主的宽松审计态度在临近跳槽年份以及更早期间都有显著体现。本研究深化了对审计师与审计客户形成雇佣关联之内在机理的理解。
除瞭箇案研究,以往基于大樣本的經驗研究併未髮現審計師在成為客戶高管前對未來僱主實施瞭更加寬鬆的審計,這似乎意味著普遍而言,從審計師成為客戶高管的鏇轉門現象併不存在有損于實際審計質量的前因。本文髮現,噹按以往文獻的做法不區分跳槽審計師是否負責未來僱主的審計業務時,我們得到與以往文獻類似的結果;而一旦作齣區分後,則髮現噹跳槽審計師負責未來僱主的審計時,未來僱主噹年的財務報錶伴隨著更高的盈餘管理(尤其是調增利潤的盈餘管理)。我們還髮現,跳槽審計師的寬鬆審計態度僅體現在對待未來僱主上,而沒有體現在自己負責的其他審計客戶上;跳槽審計師對未來僱主的寬鬆審計態度在臨近跳槽年份以及更早期間都有顯著體現。本研究深化瞭對審計師與審計客戶形成僱傭關聯之內在機理的理解。
제료개안연구,이왕기우대양본적경험연구병미발현심계사재성위객호고관전대미래고주실시료경가관송적심계,저사호의미착보편이언,종심계사성위객호고관적선전문현상병불존재유손우실제심계질량적전인。본문발현,당안이왕문헌적주법불구분도조심계사시부부책미래고주적심계업무시,아문득도여이왕문헌유사적결과;이일단작출구분후,칙발현당도조심계사부책미래고주적심계시,미래고주당년적재무보표반수착경고적영여관리(우기시조증리윤적영여관리)。아문환발현,도조심계사적관송심계태도부체현재대대미래고주상,이몰유체현재자기부책적기타심계객호상;도조심계사대미래고주적관송심계태도재림근도조년빈이급경조기간도유현저체현。본연구심화료대심계사여심계객호형성고용관련지내재궤리적리해。
Except for case-based evidence, prior large sample-based archival studies fail to find that auditors treat their prospective employers more favorably prior to the revolving-door employment. This appears to suggest that in general there is no antecedent that impairs audit quality before an auditor becomes an executive of an audit client. Our study documents similar findings if we follow the approach in prior literature by not differentiating whether the turnover auditor is charged with the audit for her prospective employer. However, once we make the differentiation, we find that the audited financial statements of prospective-employer clients are associated with significantly greater magnitude of discretionary accruals (and charged with the audit for her prospective the prospective employer, but not to other treatment not only exists in the short-term particularly income-increasing accruals) when the turnover auditor is employer. We also find that the favorable treatment is only exhibited to audit clients the turnover auditor is charged with. Further, the favorable window approaching the revolving door od. Our findings improve an understanding toward the rationale of auditor-client event, but also in an earlier peri- employment association.