CAJ | 학술논문

针对中国愈演愈烈的企业高管腐败现象，本文以2004--2013年出现高管腐败案件的上市公司为样本，从外部治理约束的角度，探讨外部治理要素对高管腐败产生的效应。研究结果表明：（1）债务约束能够对企业的高管腐败行为起到明显的抑制作用。短期债务比例越高、债务规模越大，就越能有效地降低高管腐败事件的发生率；（2）产品市场竞争与高管腐败之间呈显著负相关关系，来自产品市场竞争的压力能够有效约束企业高管的腐败行为；（3）目前中国经理人市场竞争对国有企业来说表现失灵，未能对其高管腐败行为产生显著制约作用。而对于非国有企业，经理人市场竞争表现出良好的治理作用，能够显著降低发生高管腐败的可能性；（4）在制约高管腐败行为方面，法律环境并没有显现出预期中的治理效果。
침대중국유연유렬적기업고관부패현상，본문이2004--2013년출현고관부패안건적상시공사위양본，종외부치리약속적각도，탐토외부치리요소대고관부패산생적효응。연구결과표명：（1）채무약속능구대기업적고관부패행위기도명현적억제작용。단기채무비례월고、채무규모월대，취월능유효지강저고관부패사건적발생솔；（2）산품시장경쟁여고관부패지간정현저부상관관계，래자산품시장경쟁적압력능구유효약속기업고관적부패행위；（3）목전중국경리인시장경쟁대국유기업래설표현실령，미능대기고관부패행위산생현저제약작용。이대우비국유기업，경리인시장경쟁표현출량호적치리작용，능구현저강저발생고관부패적가능성；（4）재제약고관부패행위방면，법률배경병몰유현현출예기중적치리효과。
In view of the intensified corruption of corporate executives, this paper explores the effects of external governance factors on executive corruption from the perspective of external governance constraints, using the listed companies as samples from 2004 to 2013. The results show that：（ 1 ）the debt has an obvious constrained influence on corporate execu- tives＇ corrupt behaviors. The ratio of short-term debt is higher and the scale debt is greater, the effect of reducing executive corruption incidence is more effective;（2 ）there is a significant ket competition and executive corruption,which shows that the negative correlation relationship between the product marpressure of the product market competition can effectively restrain executives corruption;（3 ）the managers market competition has no significant constrained influence on executive corruption of state-owned enterprises. However, regarding to non state-owned enterprises, the managers market competition has an constrained influence on reducing the corrupt behaviors of corporate executives ; （4） the legal environment did not show the expected effect on restricting executives corruption .