CAJ | 학술논문

公司治理机制有效与否，不仅体现在公司价值和业绩水平上，还体现在公司业绩的波动性上。管理层内部实行差别化的薪酬体系，被认为是解决代理问题的有效途径，薪酬差距越大，高管团队内的竞争越激烈，为了在业绩竞赛中打败对手，高管会竞相做出更高风险的决策，从而加大公司业绩的波动程度。本文选取2009-2011年中小板上市公司为研究样本，考察高管薪酬差距与公司业绩波动的关系，并探索管理层权力对该作用过程的影响机制。研究发现，随着高管薪酬差距的加大，公司业绩的波动性更大，风险也随之提高，在两职合一、股权分散的上市公司中，高管薪酬差距对公司业绩波动的影响更大，而高管长期在位的影响并不显著。
공사치리궤제유효여부，불부체현재공사개치화업적수평상，환체현재공사업적적파동성상。관리층내부실행차별화적신수체계，피인위시해결대리문제적유효도경，신수차거월대，고관단대내적경쟁월격렬，위료재업적경새중타패대수，고관회경상주출경고풍험적결책，종이가대공사업적적파동정도。본문선취2009-2011년중소판상시공사위연구양본，고찰고관신수차거여공사업적파동적관계，병탐색관리층권력대해작용과정적영향궤제。연구발현，수착고관신수차거적가대，공사업적적파동성경대，풍험야수지제고，재량직합일、고권분산적상시공사중，고관신수차거대공사업적파동적영향경대，이고관장기재위적영향병불현저。
Both the performance and fluctuations of a company can be used to check whether the governance mechanism of a corporate is effective or not. Most researchers consider that a differential compensation system is an effective way to solve the agency problem on the management. The greater compensation gap among executive is, the fiercer competition of the senior management team will be. Meanwhile, executives make higher risky decisions to defeat his opponents in the competition and this will increase the volatility of firm’ s performance. In this paper, we examine this relationship by selecting the data of Small and Medium Enterprise Board listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as samples and explore the mechanism of the influencing process of managerial power. We find that the fluctuations of firm’ s performance become greater with the increasing of compensation gap among executive, and it leads the company ’ s management risk to increasing. The research findings also indicate that the influence about compensation gap among executive affects the volatility of firm’ s performance, especially in companies which seat their CEO in board chair or have a diffuse ownership of the company. However, this influence is not significant if executives are sitting for a long time.