CAJ | 학술논문

本文结合小微企业融资难问题，分析P2P网络借贷的信用风险及交易可能性集合，并将信号传递博弈模型引入到P2P网络借贷行为的研究当中，分析小微企业和出借方在追求各自利益最大化的前提下达到双方利益均衡的博弈过程。研究表明：P2P网络借贷模式能够降低出借方因信用风险而造成的极端大额损失；与传统融资模式相比，P2P网络借贷模式下的交易可能性集合范围更广；小微企业在P2P网络借贷平台上发出的关于借款申请列表的信号，传递了有关小微企业真实履约能力的主要信息。
본문결합소미기업융자난문제，분석P2P망락차대적신용풍험급교역가능성집합，병장신호전체박혁모형인입도P2P망락차대행위적연구당중，분석소미기업화출차방재추구각자이익최대화적전제하체도쌍방이익균형적박혁과정。연구표명：P2P망락차대모식능구강저출차방인신용풍험이조성적겁단대액손실；여전통융자모식상비，P2P망락차대모식하적교역가능성집합범위경엄；소미기업재P2P망락차대평태상발출적관우차관신청렬표적신호，전체료유관소미기업진실리약능력적주요신식。
Combining the financing problem of the small and micro enterprises, this paper analyzes the credit risk and the trading possibility collection of the P2P network lending firstly. Then the further analysis is the game process of benefit equilibrium between the small and micro enterprises and the lenders on the premise that both of them are pursing maximum self - benefit, which is based on the introduction of the signal game model in the research of the P2P network lend- ing. The results are as follows： the P2P network lending model can reduce the extreme large losses caused by the credit risk ; compared with the traditional financing model, the range of the trading possibility collection under the P2P network lending model can be wilder; the signals about the list of loan application, which is given by the small and micro enterprises through the P2P network lending platform, transmit the main information about the real ability of the small and micro enterprises.