CAJ | 학술논문

在企业与政府有限理性的前提下，本文运用演化博弈方法构建企业与政府知识产权保护和侵权演化博弈模型，分析两类企业与政府均衡情况和策略选择，结果表明当政府的惩罚力度大于政策实施成本时，有限理性的政府会选择监管策略，此时企业是否会选择保护策略依赖于保护成本和侵权赔偿的大小；当政府的惩罚力度大于企业侵权收益时可以防止市场中的侵权行为，但此时企业可能选择搭便车行为，而不采取保护策略。
재기업여정부유한이성적전제하，본문운용연화박혁방법구건기업여정부지식산권보호화침권연화박혁모형，분석량류기업여정부균형정황화책략선택，결과표명당정부적징벌력도대우정책실시성본시，유한이성적정부회선택감관책략，차시기업시부회선택보호책략의뢰우보호성본화침권배상적대소；당정부적징벌력도대우기업침권수익시가이방지시장중적침권행위，단차시기업가능선택탑편차행위，이불채취보호책략。
Given the bounded rationality, the article analyzes the market equilibriums and optimal strategy choice of governments and two types of enterprises by employing evolutionary game model. The results show that when the government＇ s punishment is greater than the cost of implementation, the government will choose regulatory strategy, but whether enterprises will choose protection strategy or not depends on the amount of protection cost and infringement compensation. When the government＇s punishment is greater than the revenue from infringement, the infringement behavior in the market can be prevented. However, at this time the intellectual property owners may choose the free - ride behavior strategy rather than the protection strategy.