管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
Management Sciences in China
2015年
1期
1~17
,共null页
董事会 非正式层级强度 业绩压力 股权集中度 公司绩效
董事會 非正式層級彊度 業績壓力 股權集中度 公司績效
동사회 비정식층급강도 업적압력 고권집중도 공사적효
board; informal hierarchy strength ; performance pressure; ownership concentration; firm performance
董事会非正式层级是影响董事会治理效率和公司绩效的关键因素。以2010年至2012年沪、深A股1226家上市公司为研究对象,运用STATA13.0软件和分组回归分析方法,系统分析董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效间的关系及其影响机制,分别考察不同最高层级董事身份和控股股东性质对董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效关系的影响。研究结果表明,董事会内部非正式层级强度与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系,这种正相关关系只有在董事会最高层级董事不兼任总经理职务条件下才成立;业绩压力和股权集中度对董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效间的关系具有显著的正向调节效应;相对于民营控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司董事会非正式层级强度对绩效的正向效应更强,主要体现在地方政府控股上市公司中,业绩压力对董事会非正式层级强度与绩效间的正向调节效应在国有控股上市公司中不显著。研究结果证实董事会内部非正式层级的实践价值,印证了两职分离和董事会团队互补的积极效应,为优化董事会治理等提供理论支持。
董事會非正式層級是影響董事會治理效率和公司績效的關鍵因素。以2010年至2012年滬、深A股1226傢上市公司為研究對象,運用STATA13.0軟件和分組迴歸分析方法,繫統分析董事會非正式層級彊度與公司績效間的關繫及其影響機製,分彆攷察不同最高層級董事身份和控股股東性質對董事會非正式層級彊度與公司績效關繫的影響。研究結果錶明,董事會內部非正式層級彊度與公司績效之間存在顯著的正相關關繫,這種正相關關繫隻有在董事會最高層級董事不兼任總經理職務條件下纔成立;業績壓力和股權集中度對董事會非正式層級彊度與公司績效間的關繫具有顯著的正嚮調節效應;相對于民營控股上市公司,國有控股上市公司董事會非正式層級彊度對績效的正嚮效應更彊,主要體現在地方政府控股上市公司中,業績壓力對董事會非正式層級彊度與績效間的正嚮調節效應在國有控股上市公司中不顯著。研究結果證實董事會內部非正式層級的實踐價值,印證瞭兩職分離和董事會糰隊互補的積極效應,為優化董事會治理等提供理論支持。
동사회비정식층급시영향동사회치리효솔화공사적효적관건인소。이2010년지2012년호、심A고1226가상시공사위연구대상,운용STATA13.0연건화분조회귀분석방법,계통분석동사회비정식층급강도여공사적효간적관계급기영향궤제,분별고찰불동최고층급동사신빈화공고고동성질대동사회비정식층급강도여공사적효관계적영향。연구결과표명,동사회내부비정식층급강도여공사적효지간존재현저적정상관관계,저충정상관관계지유재동사회최고층급동사불겸임총경리직무조건하재성립;업적압력화고권집중도대동사회비정식층급강도여공사적효간적관계구유현저적정향조절효응;상대우민영공고상시공사,국유공고상시공사동사회비정식층급강도대적효적정향효응경강,주요체현재지방정부공고상시공사중,업적압력대동사회비정식층급강도여적효간적정향조절효응재국유공고상시공사중불현저。연구결과증실동사회내부비정식층급적실천개치,인증료량직분리화동사회단대호보적적겁효응,위우화동사회치리등제공이론지지。
Board informal hierarchy is the key factor that will affect the board governance efficiency and then the firm perform- anee. Based on the relevant data of 1 226 listed firms in Shanghai and Sbenzhen Stock Exchanges in China from the year 2010 to 2012, using the software of STATA 13.0 and grouping regression method after measuring the board informal hierarchy Strength with gini index, the paper examines the effect of board informal hierarchy Strength on firm performance and its affecting mecha- nisms. The paper also divides the listed firms into different groups to study the effect based on the different identities of the high- est rank in the board informal hierarchy and the different nature of finn's ultimate controlling shareholder. The empirical study showed that: (~)There exists a significant positive relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance, and this relationship doesn't exist when CEO has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. When there exists certain level of hierarchy, board will have multiple virtues of democracy and efficiency which will support utilizing the advantages of collective decision function and democratic centralism, and thus high quality decisions can be made quickly and efficiently. Further re- search finds that the positive effect is of high strength when a chairman has the highest rank in the beard informal hierarchy. Sec- ondly is other directors and independent directors. The relationship doesn't exist when CEO director has the highest rank in the beard informal hierarchy. The implication of the results is that when CEO has the highest rank in the beard intbrmal hierarchy, both the board's independence of decision-making and validity of supervision will be decreased. (~) Performance pressure and ownership concentration significantly and positively moderate the relationship between board infornlal hierarchy strength and firm performance. The prominent advantages of the board informal hierarchy exists in decision efficiency, and when the firms face strong performance pressure and thus there has stronger demand for efficiency of decision making, accordingly, the positive effect of informal hierarchy strength on performance will become stronger. ~ State-owned firms' board informal hierarchy strength has a stronger effect on improving the financial performance, whereas mainly in the local government-owned firms; Performance pres- sure doesn't have a significant effect on the relationship between board infornml hierarchy strength and firm performance in state- owned firms. Thus, the results confirmed the positive effects between board informal hierarchy and firm performance and also ver- ified the significance of separation of CEO and chairman of the board and eomplementarities in the board. Hence these findings can contribute theoretically on how to optimize board governance.