CAJ | 학술논문

潜在竞争者是公司重要的利益相关者，本文围绕公司的信息披露，构建“在位者一股东一潜在竞争者”的博弈模型，求解在位者与潜在竞争者交互行为的均衡结果，在此基础上进行实验检验，发现潜在竞争者有低估在位者信息披露程度的先验信念，行为决策表现为：当披露收益大于其进入成本时大都选择进入；当披露收益小于或等于进入成本时，其决策依据为披露收益与进入成本之差，当披露收益与进入成本之差较小时，一般会选择进入。研究还发现，在位者信息披露的决策信念是既要照顾股东的利益又要设法阻止潜在竞争者的进入，其行为决策表现为：当预期收益小于或等于进入成本时，执行较高程度的披露策略；当预期收益大于进入成本时，更多地选择较低程度的信息披露。另外不进入价值较大时，在位者也倾向于更低程度的信息披露。
잠재경쟁자시공사중요적이익상관자，본문위요공사적신식피로，구건“재위자일고동일잠재경쟁자”적박혁모형，구해재위자여잠재경쟁자교호행위적균형결과，재차기출상진행실험검험，발현잠재경쟁자유저고재위자신식피로정도적선험신념，행위결책표현위：당피로수익대우기진입성본시대도선택진입；당피로수익소우혹등우진입성본시，기결책의거위피로수익여진입성본지차，당피로수익여진입성본지차교소시，일반회선택진입。연구환발현，재위자신식피로적결책신념시기요조고고동적이익우요설법조지잠재경쟁자적진입，기행위결책표현위：당예기수익소우혹등우진입성본시，집행교고정도적피로책략；당예기수익대우진입성본시，경다지선택교저정도적신식피로。령외불진입개치교대시，재위자야경향우경저정도적신식피로。
The common sense of stakeholders are usually specific for a particular company, despite different stakeholders＇ residual claims vary under different states of the company＇s assets and liabilities. In terms of specific companies, stakeholders are a community of interests, and the potential competitors are a relevant party outside of the community of interests. The information disclosed has to ensure the shareholders＇ decision making correctly, and also to prevent the entrance of potential competitors. Thereby, the information disclosure is a dilemmatic strategy procedure. Focusing on the information disclosure of companies, we have got an equilibrium result on the interactive behavior of the incumbents and the potential competitors by establishing an ＂incumbent--shareholder--potential competitors＂ tripartite game model. By using the experimental method, we find that the potential competitors hold a prior belief which underestimates the extent of the incumbents＇ information disclosure with the follow- ing behavior： they make the entry decision based on the relationship between the disclosure profit and entry cost. The entry cost and incumbent＇s extra profit do not impact on the potential competitors＇ decision. Mostly, the potential competitors will choose to enter when the disclosed income is larger than the entry cost; or else, their behavior pattern depends on the gap between the disclosed income and entry cost. Generally, they will choose to enter if the gap is narrow. In regard to the incumbents＇ beliefs of information disclosure, they have to balance between maximizing the shareholders＇ interests and excluding the entry of potential competitors. The results show that, the incumbents will implement higher level of disclosure strategy when the expected income is larger than the entry cost; otherwise, they opt to choose lower level ones. Besides, the incumbents tend to lower level information disclosure when the extra profit is higher. As the market economy develops production factors flow more smoothly. The barrier of potential competitors convening to competitors is lower. Incumbent pays more attention on the potential competitors when disclosing information, which has important practical significance.