南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2015年
1期
118~129
,共null页
媒体追捧 明星CEO 薪酬 公司治理
媒體追捧 明星CEO 薪酬 公司治理
매체추봉 명성CEO 신수 공사치리
Media Blurbs; Superstar CEO; Compensation; Corporate Governance
本文以2005-2010年媒体评选的明星C E O作为研究样本,实证检验媒体追捧报道的动机及其对明星CEO薪酬的影响。研究发现,一方面,CEO的经营能力并不是决定其能否成为媒体追捧对象的决定因素,相反,获得上市公司的广告收入与迎合公众的认知偏好才是媒体追捧明星C E O的真实原因;另一方面,媒体的追捧报道不但没有提高公司经营业绩与明星C E O薪酬之间的敏感性,反而进一步强化了明星C E O在公司管理结构中无形的权威和影响力,使其获得了丰厚的个人薪酬。本文研究表明,现实中的媒体可能为利益所“收买”,成为公司管理层攫取私利的“鼓噪者”,媒体的追捧报道不仅没有起到树立真正光辉典范的作用,反而弱化和降低了公司治理的有效性,引发了消极的经济后果。本文对媒体追捧报道的动机及其对明星C E O薪酬的影响分析,将有益于全面和客观评价媒体在资本市场中的作用。
本文以2005-2010年媒體評選的明星C E O作為研究樣本,實證檢驗媒體追捧報道的動機及其對明星CEO薪酬的影響。研究髮現,一方麵,CEO的經營能力併不是決定其能否成為媒體追捧對象的決定因素,相反,穫得上市公司的廣告收入與迎閤公衆的認知偏好纔是媒體追捧明星C E O的真實原因;另一方麵,媒體的追捧報道不但沒有提高公司經營業績與明星C E O薪酬之間的敏感性,反而進一步彊化瞭明星C E O在公司管理結構中無形的權威和影響力,使其穫得瞭豐厚的箇人薪酬。本文研究錶明,現實中的媒體可能為利益所“收買”,成為公司管理層攫取私利的“鼓譟者”,媒體的追捧報道不僅沒有起到樹立真正光輝典範的作用,反而弱化和降低瞭公司治理的有效性,引髮瞭消極的經濟後果。本文對媒體追捧報道的動機及其對明星C E O薪酬的影響分析,將有益于全麵和客觀評價媒體在資本市場中的作用。
본문이2005-2010년매체평선적명성C E O작위연구양본,실증검험매체추봉보도적동궤급기대명성CEO신수적영향。연구발현,일방면,CEO적경영능력병불시결정기능부성위매체추봉대상적결정인소,상반,획득상시공사적엄고수입여영합공음적인지편호재시매체추봉명성C E O적진실원인;령일방면,매체적추봉보도불단몰유제고공사경영업적여명성C E O신수지간적민감성,반이진일보강화료명성C E O재공사관리결구중무형적권위화영향력,사기획득료봉후적개인신수。본문연구표명,현실중적매체가능위이익소“수매”,성위공사관리층확취사리적“고조자”,매체적추봉보도불부몰유기도수립진정광휘전범적작용,반이약화화강저료공사치리적유효성,인발료소겁적경제후과。본문대매체추봉보도적동궤급기대명성C E O신수적영향분석,장유익우전면화객관평개매체재자본시장중적작용。
In the sphere of corporate governance, media coverage can influence managers and board members and force them to take corrective actions to enhance shareholder wealth. But meanwhile, the media in the real world can't always keep the objective stand to report the news and the media bias, which came from the cognitive preferences, economic benefit, and political pressure, etc., has been widely documented. This paper empirically examines the motivation of media blurbs on superstar CEOs and its economic consequences, especially its impact on the corporate governance of the corresponding CEOs' firms. Our results indicate that the CEOs' ability and firm performance is not the vital determinant of media blurbs on superstar CEOs, rather the key factors lie in the adverting expenditure spent on media firms, as well as the audience preference on the legendary stories of the superstar CEOs. We also find that the media blurbs take no part in enhancing the sensitivity between firm performance and CEO compensation; rather the coverage endows more power to the CEOs, and helps them grab higher compensation. In reality, media also would be bribed for commercial interests and become cheerleaders for management to obtain private benefits from companies. In general, we posit that media do not pick up the right CEOs as the superstar in a socially acceptable manner, but weaken the corporate governance of the corresponding superstar CEO firms, causing negative social and financial consequences. The conclusions contribute to objectively and systematically recognize the effects of media in the stock market. Besides that, our paper also has some interesting implications: First, the superstar CEOs awarded by the media doesn't mean that they have excellent ability than the other CEOs without the award, on the contrary, it could predict the worse accounting performance in the future; Second, the investors should gain the news or the information derived from the diverse source in order to avoid making wrong decision based on the media bias.