南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2015年
1期
152~160
,共null页
异常派现 代理成本 公司价值 交乘项 回归模型
異常派現 代理成本 公司價值 交乘項 迴歸模型
이상파현 대리성본 공사개치 교승항 회귀모형
Abnormal Dividend; Agency Costs; Company＇s Value;Regression Model with Interaction Item
现金股利的异常派现行为体现了公司内部人利益，是一种非理性派现行为。本文采用2010-2012年中国沪市和深市3414家上市公司作为研究样本，实证检验了异常派现、代理成本和公司价值之间的关系。基准模型的实证结果表明，异常高派现会减少公司内部人所控制的现金资源，增加公司的代理成本，降低代理效率和公司价值。正常派现会增加代理效率与公司价值，是一种理性派现行为。加入交乘项的模型实证结果表明，控制结构哑变量会影响异常高派现公司的代理成本，也会影响异常低派现公司的代理效率。股权性质哑变量不会通过派现行为对公司代理效率产生显著影响，仅有私有性质哑变量通过异常低派现，降低公司的代理效率。
現金股利的異常派現行為體現瞭公司內部人利益，是一種非理性派現行為。本文採用2010-2012年中國滬市和深市3414傢上市公司作為研究樣本，實證檢驗瞭異常派現、代理成本和公司價值之間的關繫。基準模型的實證結果錶明，異常高派現會減少公司內部人所控製的現金資源，增加公司的代理成本，降低代理效率和公司價值。正常派現會增加代理效率與公司價值，是一種理性派現行為。加入交乘項的模型實證結果錶明，控製結構啞變量會影響異常高派現公司的代理成本，也會影響異常低派現公司的代理效率。股權性質啞變量不會通過派現行為對公司代理效率產生顯著影響，僅有私有性質啞變量通過異常低派現，降低公司的代理效率。
현금고리적이상파현행위체현료공사내부인이익，시일충비이성파현행위。본문채용2010-2012년중국호시화심시3414가상시공사작위연구양본，실증검험료이상파현、대리성본화공사개치지간적관계。기준모형적실증결과표명，이상고파현회감소공사내부인소공제적현금자원，증가공사적대리성본，강저대리효솔화공사개치。정상파현회증가대리효솔여공사개치，시일충이성파현행위。가입교승항적모형실증결과표명，공제결구아변량회영향이상고파현공사적대리성본，야회영향이상저파현공사적대리효솔。고권성질아변량불회통과파현행위대공사대리효솔산생현저영향，부유사유성질아변량통과이상저파현，강저공사적대리효솔。
According to the principal-agent theory, cash dividend plays an important role in restricting the insider control. Jensen pointed out in 1986 that payouts to shareholders can reduce the resources under managers＇ control, thereby reduce managers＇ power. However, Jensen had no regard for the concentration of ownership. A growing research suggests that the concentration of ownership is a common phenomenon in most countries. In fact, large shareholders control a significant number of firms in developed countries. In developing economies, ownership is heavily concentrated. So large shareholders play important role in firm dividend policy. On the one hand, large shareholders are active in improving corporate governance, but on the other hand, large shareholders as company＇s insiders can gain private benefits of control right by concentrated ownership. In the Chinese stock market, large shareholders are widespread. Large shareholders can gain private benefits by cash dividend. In this case, cash dividend shows different forms, such as abnormal high dividend, abnormal low dividend and normal dividend. Abnormal dividend embodies the insider＇s interests, and increase agency costs thus reduce company＇s Value. Based on the data of 2041 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2012, the thesis inspects the relation among abnormal dividend, agency costs and company＇s Value. The results of benchmark model show that, abnormal high dividend can reduce the insider＇s cash resource, increase agency costs, reduce agency efficiency and company＇s value. Normal dividend is a rational dividend behavior, because that it can increase agency efficiency and company＇s value. The results of interaction item model show that, control structure dummy variable has significant effect on agency cost of abnormal high dividend companies and agency efficiency of abnormal low dividend companies. Dummy variable of ownership property has no significant effect on company＇s agency efficiency by dividend behavior. Only dummy variable of private property can reduce company＇s agency efficiency by abnormal low dividend. The conclusions have important implications for corporate governance. It primarily embodies in limiting abnormal high dividend, supervising abnormal low dividend and encouraging normal dividend.
