北京工商大学学报:社会科学版
北京工商大學學報:社會科學版
북경공상대학학보:사회과학판
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY
2015年
1期
69~79
,共null页
股东控制 关联交易 掏空
股東控製 關聯交易 掏空
고동공제 관련교역 도공
shareholder control; connected transaction; tunneling
由于我国国有股东的特点,国有第一大股东的公司可能会出现另类股东控制。在另类股东控制下,公司主要代理问题是另类控股股东与控股股东和其他中小股东的利益冲突,另类控股股东可能会掏空上市公司。文章依据海南航空的股权结构、董事会成员和高管构成确定其为另类股东控制,并以海航集团与海南航空系列关联交易为案例,研究海航集团如何掏空海南航空。海航集团通过一系列高评估增值甚至超高评估增值的股权转让给海南航空,从海南航空套取资金或转移利益,导致海南航空为过多持有货币资金而大量负债、大量支付利息,降低了其盈利能力,甚至直接损害了其他股东利益。研究结果引发了对关联方掏空上市公司监管、投资者保障机制设置、资产评估监管和国有资产改革等政策方面的探讨。本研究理论上拓展了公司控制权理论、公司代理问题和掏空理论等的研究内容,实践上可以为我国上市公司监管实践和国资改革提供重要指导。
由于我國國有股東的特點,國有第一大股東的公司可能會齣現另類股東控製。在另類股東控製下,公司主要代理問題是另類控股股東與控股股東和其他中小股東的利益遲突,另類控股股東可能會掏空上市公司。文章依據海南航空的股權結構、董事會成員和高管構成確定其為另類股東控製,併以海航集糰與海南航空繫列關聯交易為案例,研究海航集糰如何掏空海南航空。海航集糰通過一繫列高評估增值甚至超高評估增值的股權轉讓給海南航空,從海南航空套取資金或轉移利益,導緻海南航空為過多持有貨幣資金而大量負債、大量支付利息,降低瞭其盈利能力,甚至直接損害瞭其他股東利益。研究結果引髮瞭對關聯方掏空上市公司鑑管、投資者保障機製設置、資產評估鑑管和國有資產改革等政策方麵的探討。本研究理論上拓展瞭公司控製權理論、公司代理問題和掏空理論等的研究內容,實踐上可以為我國上市公司鑑管實踐和國資改革提供重要指導。
유우아국국유고동적특점,국유제일대고동적공사가능회출현령류고동공제。재령류고동공제하,공사주요대리문제시령류공고고동여공고고동화기타중소고동적이익충돌,령류공고고동가능회도공상시공사。문장의거해남항공적고권결구、동사회성원화고관구성학정기위령류고동공제,병이해항집단여해남항공계렬관련교역위안례,연구해항집단여하도공해남항공。해항집단통과일계렬고평고증치심지초고평고증치적고권전양급해남항공,종해남항공투취자금혹전이이익,도치해남항공위과다지유화폐자금이대량부채、대량지부이식,강저료기영리능력,심지직접손해료기타고동이익。연구결과인발료대관련방도공상시공사감관、투자자보장궤제설치、자산평고감관화국유자산개혁등정책방면적탐토。본연구이론상탁전료공사공제권이론、공사대리문제화도공이론등적연구내용,실천상가이위아국상시공사감관실천화국자개혁제공중요지도。
Due to the characteristics of China's state-owned shareholders, there may be alternative shareholder control in the state-owned companies as the largest shareholder. Under alternative shareholder control, the main agency problem is the interest conflicts among alternative shareholder, controlling shareholder and other small and medium-sized shareholders. The alternative shareholder may tunnel the listed company crazily. Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd. is classified as alternative shareholder control ac- cording to its ownership structure, board members and executive composition. This paper studies the connected transactions be- tween HNA Group and Hainan Airlines to clarify how HNA Group has tunneled Hainan Airlines by a series of connected transac- tions. HNA Group obtains cash and gains profits from Hainan Airlines through a series of high value-added shares transferred to Hainan Airlines. Those connected transactions has made Hainan Airlines hold too much cash resulting in too many debts to pay a lot of interests, which reduces its profitability and even directly damages the interests of other shareholders. The research result provokes a probe into the supervision of tunnel in listed companies through connected transactions, investor protection mecha- nism, asset appraisal regulation, state-owned assets reform, etc. The research expands the theory research content of corporate control rights, agency problem and tunneling theory and provides important practical guidance for listing corporation regulatory and reform of state-owned assets.