CAJ | 학술논문

市场竞争促使越来越多发展中国家企业成为劳工认证供应链的一部分。劳工标准借助于贸易平台移植到中国,对中国劳工条件甚至劳工法律制度都产生一定影响,但对现实情况的分析发现其影响还处于初级阶段。基于产品卖方主导型市场结构,采用信号模型研究中国劳工标准移植的微观机理时发现,供应商的劳工标准趋于最低要求水平是供应商借助卖方市场势力帕累托改进的结果;当公司类型的概率分布函数为凹函数时,劳工标准会收敛到最低点均衡,而非高于最低点。发展中国家处于卖方主导型市场的企业要利用劳工标准移植契机,内在提高劳工条件,让劳工信号带动产品质量提高,为更多采购商和消费者接受,以获得更大的市场势力。
시장경쟁촉사월래월다발전중국가기업성위노공인증공응련적일부분。노공표준차조우무역평태이식도중국,대중국노공조건심지노공법률제도도산생일정영향,단대현실정황적분석발현기영향환처우초급계단。기우산품매방주도형시장결구,채용신호모형연구중국노공표준이식적미관궤리시발현,공응상적노공표준추우최저요구수평시공응상차조매방시장세력파루탁개진적결과;당공사류형적개솔분포함수위요함수시,노공표준회수렴도최저점균형,이비고우최저점。발전중국가처우매방주도형시장적기업요이용노공표준이식계궤,내재제고노공조건,양노공신호대동산품질량제고,위경다채구상화소비자접수,이획득경대적시장세력。
Sweatshops in developing countries have been highly condemned by consumers from developed countries.Corporate social responsibility movement and competition in the market have prompted more and more companies in developing countries to become a part of the labor certification of the supply chain.Since Labor standards which have been transplanted by means of trading platforms have had some impacts on the Chinese labor conditions and labor legal systems,the field investigation found that the impacts were still at the early stage.As buyers and sellers can not agree on product-related information under asymmetry information,labor standard is like a signal, which can determine the share and efficiency of both transactions through its transmission and screening.Based on the sellers-led market structure,this paper uses signal model to analyze situation of labor standards transplant in China.The study indicates that：（1）The level of suppliers＇labor standards tends to be minimum due to the results of Pareto improvement by the suppliers with their market forces;suppliers（or manufacturers）must bearthe cost of signals while transmitting them,so there will be distribution of resources distorted compared to the original configuration.And as the recipients of signals,buyers screen signals on different posterior probability,and offer different prices according to recognition of the signals and form a self-confirmed multiple equilibrium.Rational suppliers who maximize individuals income under seller-led market structure adjust the equilibrium price signals to achieve Pareto optimality through the market mechanism step by step,thus showing a lower labor standard.Finally it leads to a fully-confirmed equilibrium,which is also more stable one.（2）If the distribution function of the companies types is sufficiently concave,labor standards will converge to the lowest point of equilibrium,not higher than the lowest one.When there are more companies with lower ability,pooling equilibrium of minimum standard will be produced.The companies with higher ability will choose to lower labor standards signals,which is the result of collective rationality. When the types of companies present concave function distribution,it means that the intensity of companies with low labor standards is so high that buyers can gain the lower average earnings.The final equilibrium tends to be the lowest point under the game of buyers and suppliers on circumstance of participation constraints.On one hand buyers can avoid taking the risks of getting negative expected returns,on the other hand there is a pooling and cooperative equilibrium at the lowest point among the companies.When the types of companies present convex function distribution,it means that intensity of companies with high labor standards is so high that the final equilibrium tends to be higher than the lowest one.In the long run,the″new″returns brought about under the separating equilibrium tend to be higher than that under the lowest pooling equilibrium.Some companies in developing countries based on seller-led market should take advantage of the opportunities of labor standards transplant to improve labor conditions inherently,allowing labor standards signal to drive product quality for more acceptance of buyers and consumers so as to gain greater market forces.