CAJ | 학술논문

现有团队道德风险文献更多的是针对企业内部多成员（多代理人）进行研究的,而鲜有运用团队道德风险理论模型研究集团企业内部的道德风险问题。文章将集团下属子公司看做团队中的同质性多个代理人,把担保集团的实际影响因素合理地加入已有的团队道德风险模型,以此来研究集团道德风险问题。通过对新构造的模型的数理分析,揭示出担保集团对子公司的激励约束机制,并运用实证研究验证了理论模型和结论的有效性。
현유단대도덕풍험문헌경다적시침대기업내부다성원（다대리인）진행연구적,이선유운용단대도덕풍험이론모형연구집단기업내부적도덕풍험문제。문장장집단하속자공사간주단대중적동질성다개대리인,파담보집단적실제영향인소합리지가입이유적단대도덕풍험모형,이차래연구집단도덕풍험문제。통과대신구조적모형적수리분석,게시출담보집단대자공사적격려약속궤제,병운용실증연구험증료이론모형화결론적유효성。
In order to solve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises（ SMEs）,a financial support model named the Credit Guarantee System is widely adopted by many countries（ Liu Zhirong,2009）. Presently,nearly 48% of all countries have established mature SME credit guarantee systems which share three characteristics. First,the government should make financing contributions and undertake certain responsibilities after determining the financing guarantee as a policy guarantee. Second,government departments should assist SMEs in organizing and managing parts of the guarantee systems and institutions. Third,there is a growing need for commercial guarantee companies of SMEs,because those companies only engage in guarantees for profitable business with low risk,such as engineering guarantee,judicial guarantee.Therefore,there are very few studies about commercial guarantee companies,including guarantee companies and groups that undertake financing policy guarantees. In contrast,China＇s national policy guarantees institutions for non-profit organizations and are based on the narrow scope of business. About 50% of guarantee funds in China＇s policy,guarantee institutions from the budget appropriation of the state and local government（ Wang Sulian,2005）. Furthermore,with the continuous expansion of the guarantee business,the demand for financial injection is bound to become stronger. However,it is impractical to consider China＇s present financial status. The guarantee industry is internationally recognized as high risky industry. Therefore,risk prevention and control are the first important task. Anew mechanism is proposed by integrating and diversifying business activities to help enterprises avoid risks（ PAN WU,2006）. The proposed mechanism is useful for enterprises to prevent and control risks.The current study primarily focuses on team moral hazard of internal members（ agents） in enterprises. Very few studies use theoretical models to address moral hazard problems existing in enterprise groups. The present study considers guarantee group and its subsidiaries as homogeneous individuals that adopts the allocation compensatory proportion factors and guarantees balance factors,such as specific factors used in team moral hazard model. Mathematical expressions for incentives and restraints via mathematical analysis are obtained. After incorporating the strength of incentives into the formulas,we propose hypotheses to test the relationships between these explanatory variables and the strength of incentives.We conducted our survey with the Credit Orienwise Group,its subsidiaries,and five guarantee groups consisting of nearly 40 guarantee enterprises. Our empirical study used SPSS16. 0 to construct a regression equation,which not only validates our proposed hypotheses but also proves the rationality and effectiveness of team moral hazard＇s mathematical mode.The research has three major findings. First,the salary system has a positive relationship between subsidiaries＇ business capacity and the guarantee groups＇ incentives. Second,with the increase of allocation compensatory proportion of subsidiaries,the groups＇ incentive strength could be reduced. Third,with the increase of the degree of risk changes and the degree of risk aversions of secure businesses,the groups＇ incentives for subsidiaries should be increased.