CAJ | 학술논문

针对消费者对生鲜农产品新鲜度要求较高但供应商独自保鲜动力不足的问题,在构建消费者时变效用函数的基础上建立了由零售商和供应商组成的两级生鲜农产品供应链利润模型,设计了＂基于生鲜农产品新鲜度的采购价＂契约和＂批发价＋保鲜成本分担＂契约两种促进供应商提高保鲜努力的激励机制。研究发现,两种激励机制均能提高供应商保鲜努力水平,并且在一定程度上实现供应链协调。当零售商具有强势地位时,其在＂基于生鲜农产品新鲜度的采购价＂契约下比＂批发价＋保鲜成本分担＂契约下能够获得更高的利润。最后通过数值算例分析了不同消费者偏好对供应链最优决策的影响。
침대소비자대생선농산품신선도요구교고단공응상독자보선동력불족적문제,재구건소비자시변효용함수적기출상건립료유령수상화공응상조성적량급생선농산품공응련리윤모형,설계료＂기우생선농산품신선도적채구개＂계약화＂비발개＋보선성본분담＂계약량충촉진공응상제고보선노력적격려궤제。연구발현,량충격려궤제균능제고공응상보선노력수평,병차재일정정도상실현공응련협조。당령수상구유강세지위시,기재＂기우생선농산품신선도적채구개＂계약하비＂비발개＋보선성본분담＂계약하능구획득경고적리윤。최후통과수치산례분석료불동소비자편호대공응련최우결책적영향。
The preservation of fresh agricultural products in the distribution process has been drawing serious attention from society. It has become one kind of competition means and social responsibility for companies and the whole supply chain to provide consumers with fresher products. However,companies in the fresh agricultural products＇ supply chain do not have strong motives to cover the preservation costs alone because of the costly cold chain transportation or cold storage construction fees. Supply chain members＇ reluctance to cooperate can lead to a greater loss of fresh agricultural products in distribution channels and fail to provide high quality products for consumers. The key factor of solving this problem is to strengthen the cooperation among companies in the supply chain.To improve the cooperation among supply chain members,this study proposes a two-echelon supply chain profit model,which consists of one retailer and one supplier,based on consumer time-varying utility function. By employing the Stackelberg game,the supplier＇s optimal preservation efforts and the retailer＇s optimal pricing are analyzed under decentralized settings and centralized settings. We find that the supplier＇s preservation effort is lower in the decentralized setting. To encourage the supplier to improve preservation efforts,we designed two retailer-development incentive mechanisms,including a ＂ wholesale price preservation cost sharing ＂contract and a ＂purchase price based on product freshness＂contract.The results show that both the incentive mechanisms can encourage the supplier to improve preservation efforts and realize supply chain coordination to some extent. However,the application scope of the incentive mechanisms depends on whether the retailer has a relatively strong position. If so,both the incentive mechanisms are applicable. Under the＂purchase price based on product freshness＂contract,the retailer decides purchase price based on products＇ freshness level. As long as the supplier＇s profit after investing preservation effort is higher than that of not using preservation effort,the retailer can obtain higher profit than the ＂ wholesale price ＋preservation cost sharing＂ contract. If not,only the ＂ wholesale price ＋ preservation cost sharing＂ contract can improve supply chain coordination. Under the circumstance,the retailer shares more proportion of preservation cost to obtain a lower wholesale price from the supplier and achieve the same optimal pricing as that in the centralized setting.Finally,the numerical analyses reveal that if consumers have more preference for agricultural product＇s freshness the retailer＇s incentive mechanisms can effectively realize supply chain coordination. If consumers have more preference for agricultural product＇s price,it＇s more difficult to realize supply chain coordination via retailer＇s incentive mechanisms.All in all,if the retailer takes the appropriate incentive mechanism,the supplier＇s preservation effort can be improved. However,different retailers have different incentive mechanisms. Besides,the retailers should consider consumer preferences when designing incentive mechanisms.