CAJ | 학술논문

文章对高管薪酬业绩敏感性以及粘性进行了理论回顾和分析，在此基础上构建理论模型，采用我国非金融类A股上市公司2007-2011年连续5年的面板数据进行实证研究，验证了我国非金融类上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效的正相关关系，证实了高管薪酬粘性的存在性并分析了其时间发展趋势，最后从董事会特征的角度寻找可以降低薪酬粘性的因素，以期更好地维护薪酬契约的有效性。
문장대고관신수업적민감성이급점성진행료이론회고화분석，재차기출상구건이론모형，채용아국비금융류A고상시공사2007-2011년련속5년적면판수거진행실증연구，험증료아국비금융류상시공사고관신수여기업적효적정상관관계，증실료고관신수점성적존재성병분석료기시간발전추세，최후종동사회특정적각도심조가이강저신수점성적인소，이기경호지유호신수계약적유효성。
Based on theoretical analysis on executive compensation and the characteristics of its stickiness, this paper estab- lishes a model and applies the successive five-year panel data from the year 2007 to 2011 of non-financial A-share listed corpora- tions for empirical study. This study exemplifies the positive relationship between the executive compensation in these corporations and their business performance, verifies the existence problem of executive compensation stickiness and analyzes its trend over time, and tries to find out solutions to reduce compensation stickiness from the perspective of board characteristic so as to better maintain the validity of the compensation contract.