工业技术经济
工業技術經濟
공업기술경제
Industrial Technology & Economy
2015年
2期
106~110
,共null页
ICT 低碳 节能减排 协同创新 博弈行为 协调策略
ICT 低碳 節能減排 協同創新 博弈行為 協調策略
ICT 저탄 절능감배 협동창신 박혁행위 협조책략
ICY; low- carbon; energy saving and emission reduction; cooperative innovation; game behavior; coordinationstrategy
通过ICT促进节能减排,实现低碳经济发展,需要ICT低碳方案提供商、高能耗工业企业及政府的共同努力。基于博弈论分析高能耗工业企业与ICT低碳方案提供商通过收入分享方式合作时,本文分析了各方的最优投入水平,以及政府激励和监管的协调作用。研究表明收入分享比例是影响合作与否的关键;政府资金资助和监管惩罚力度、税收优惠能分别提高ICT低碳方案提供商和高能耗工业企业的最优投入,协调双方因收入分享比例导致的利益冲突,但须合理设置经费资助的首期拨付比例。
通過ICT促進節能減排,實現低碳經濟髮展,需要ICT低碳方案提供商、高能耗工業企業及政府的共同努力。基于博弈論分析高能耗工業企業與ICT低碳方案提供商通過收入分享方式閤作時,本文分析瞭各方的最優投入水平,以及政府激勵和鑑管的協調作用。研究錶明收入分享比例是影響閤作與否的關鍵;政府資金資助和鑑管懲罰力度、稅收優惠能分彆提高ICT低碳方案提供商和高能耗工業企業的最優投入,協調雙方因收入分享比例導緻的利益遲突,但鬚閤理設置經費資助的首期撥付比例。
통과ICT촉진절능감배,실현저탄경제발전,수요ICT저탄방안제공상、고능모공업기업급정부적공동노력。기우박혁론분석고능모공업기업여ICT저탄방안제공상통과수입분향방식합작시,본문분석료각방적최우투입수평,이급정부격려화감관적협조작용。연구표명수입분향비례시영향합작여부적관건;정부자금자조화감관징벌력도、세수우혜능분별제고ICT저탄방안제공상화고능모공업기업적최우투입,협조쌍방인수입분향비례도치적이익충돌,단수합리설치경비자조적수기발부비례。
The joint efforts of ICY low carbon program provider, high energy consumption of industrial enterprises and the govern- ment are needed to promote energy saving and emission reduction to achieve the development of low carbon economy through the ICT. The optimal investment of high energy consumption of industrial enterprises and ICT low carbon program provider and the coordination effect of government incentives and regulatory are analyzed based on the game theory under income sharing cooperation condition. Research shows that revenue sharing rate is the key influence of cooperation. The government funding and regulatory penalties, tax incentives can respec- tively improve the optimal investment of ICY low carbon solutions providers and high energy consumption of industrial enterprises, and coor- dinate conflicts caused by income share proportion, but the first pav rate of funding approoriation must be reasonablv set.