系统工程理论与实践
繫統工程理論與實踐
계통공정이론여실천
Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice
2015年
2期
324~332
,共null页
政府竞争 公共教育 动态博弈 收入差距
政府競爭 公共教育 動態博弈 收入差距
정부경쟁 공공교육 동태박혁 수입차거
intergovernmental competition; public education; dynamic game; income distribution
在代际交叠模型的基础上, 构建了分权体制下中央和区域政府公共教育投入的动态博弈模型, 探讨了存在区域不平衡情形下两级政府公共教育投入分担及其对区域差距演变的影响. 分析显示,中央政府是否应进行公共教育投入依赖于区域差距的程度, 但二者并不呈单调正相关关系,同时导出并分析了在区域差距程度的不同范围下中央和区域政府的均衡教育投入分担, 并进一步据此探讨了差距的演变趋势. 最后, 结合我国实际, 讨论了政策含义.
在代際交疊模型的基礎上, 構建瞭分權體製下中央和區域政府公共教育投入的動態博弈模型, 探討瞭存在區域不平衡情形下兩級政府公共教育投入分擔及其對區域差距縯變的影響. 分析顯示,中央政府是否應進行公共教育投入依賴于區域差距的程度, 但二者併不呈單調正相關關繫,同時導齣併分析瞭在區域差距程度的不同範圍下中央和區域政府的均衡教育投入分擔, 併進一步據此探討瞭差距的縯變趨勢. 最後, 結閤我國實際, 討論瞭政策含義.
재대제교첩모형적기출상, 구건료분권체제하중앙화구역정부공공교육투입적동태박혁모형, 탐토료존재구역불평형정형하량급정부공공교육투입분담급기대구역차거연변적영향. 분석현시,중앙정부시부응진행공공교육투입의뢰우구역차거적정도, 단이자병불정단조정상관관계,동시도출병분석료재구역차거정도적불동범위하중앙화구역정부적균형교육투입분담, 병진일보거차탐토료차거적연변추세. 최후, 결합아국실제, 토론료정책함의.
This paper studies the education policy choices in a decentralized economy with two levels of governments and regional income disparity. We employ a dynamic game model incorporating overlapping generations to analyze the optimal education spending of the central and local governments, and the subsequent effects of such financing arrangements on the dynamics of regional income distribution. We show that, whether the central government should provide public education and what level should be provided would depend on the extent of regional disparity. Only when the disparity is large could the provision of public education by the central government improve social welfare and reduce regional disparity over time. The optimal education expenditure of central government, however, does not monotonically increase with the extent of regional disparity. Finally, policy implications for China are discussed.