CAJ | 학술논문

以2007—2012年间中国民营上市公司为样本,从超额雇员、员工报酬以及不同劳动力供给状况下外部高管对员工雇用政策的影响三方面,考察外部高管能否改善公司员工雇用政策。结果发现：聘用外部高管越多的企业其超额雇员规模越少,员工报酬也越高;在劳动力供给较丰富的地区,聘用外部高管较多的企业其超额雇员较少,员工报酬也相对较低。结论表明,外部高管采用减少企业冗余雇员并提高在职员工报酬的雇用政策,同时根据外部劳动力市场供给对员工雇用政策进行灵活调整,提升了员工配置效率。
이2007—2012년간중국민영상시공사위양본,종초액고원、원공보수이급불동노동력공급상황하외부고관대원공고용정책적영향삼방면,고찰외부고관능부개선공사원공고용정책。결과발현：빙용외부고관월다적기업기초액고원규모월소,원공보수야월고;재노동력공급교봉부적지구,빙용외부고관교다적기업기초액고원교소,원공보수야상대교저。결론표명,외부고관채용감소기업용여고원병제고재직원공보수적고용정책,동시근거외부노동력시장공급대원공고용정책진행령활조정,제승료원공배치효솔。
Using the samples of family listed companies from 2007 to 2012 in China, this paper tests effects of outside top managers on excessive employment and employee salary, and the impact of labor market supply on the relation between outside top managers and enterprise employee policy. The research finds that when outside top manager＇s percent increases, excessive employments decrease and employee salary become higher. In the provinces that labor market supply is richer, for enterprises with more outside top managers, ex- cessive employments are less and employee salary is lower. These findings show that outside top managers car- ry out the policies which decrease excessive employment and increase employee salary, and flexibly adjust em- ployee employment policy according to the external labor market supply, which means that the appointment of outside top managers can improve employee employment policy and employee allocation efficiency.