CAJ | 학술논문

文章以“保护待售”模型为基础,构建了一个两阶段非合作博弈模型,考察了反倾销和反补贴措施背后的利益集团影响,并且利用2004~2013年工业行业数据进行验证。结果表明：在反倾销和反补贴领域,各行业中确实存在能够影响政策的国内外利益集团;他们的影响方式分别是代表委员类政治联系和外国政府的政治压力;如果某行业存在能够影响政府的国内利益集团,则其将会获得较高的贸易保护;如果存在能够影响政府的国外利益集团,则其将会更偏向自由贸易。中国政府制定贸易政策时兼顾社会福利和利益集团利益。
문장이“보호대수”모형위기출,구건료일개량계단비합작박혁모형,고찰료반경소화반보첩조시배후적이익집단영향,병차이용2004~2013년공업행업수거진행험증。결과표명：재반경소화반보첩영역,각행업중학실존재능구영향정책적국내외이익집단;타문적영향방식분별시대표위원류정치련계화외국정부적정치압력;여과모행업존재능구영향정부적국내이익집단,칙기장회획득교고적무역보호;여과존재능구영향정부적국외이익집단,칙기장회경편향자유무역。중국정부제정무역정책시겸고사회복리화이익집단이익。
The paper constructs a two-stage non-cooperative theoretical model to analyze the influence of interest groups on the measure of anti-dumping and countervailing, with the ＂Protection for Sale＂ framework of political trade economics as the foundation. Meanwhile, it makes use of the 2004~2013 data of Chinese industrial sectors to test the results. The results show that： in the area of anti--dumping and countervailing, the interest groups which can affect the government do exist; political connection with the type of delegation is domestic interest groups＇ way of influence, while foreign interest groups take advantage of political pressure from their home country to impact Chinese government; when domestic interest groups are organized in one sector, the sector is likely to get more protection from the government; when foreign interest groups are organized in one sector, the sector is likely to do the free trade. Chinese government equally emphasizes the interest of interest groups and that of social welfare.