CAJ | 학술논문

叠加认证能显著提升消费者对食品质量安全的信任程度和额外支付意愿。采用专业大户、合作社和龙头企业三类现代农业生产经营主体的数据,利用Heckman两阶段选择模型分析浙江省食用农产品生产主体的质量安全多重认证行为后发现,生产主体的多重认证行为除受生产主体的经营规模、人力资本、自有品牌状况等个体特征与市场结构特征显著影响外,还受到市场激励、主体责任压力和交易成本的显著影响。总体而言,生产主体的质量安全认证行为是在自身能力及环境约束下的成本收益权衡,生产主体的质量安全多重认证行为更主要是受市场激励和主体内在责任的驱动,而非政府的规制压力。
첩가인증능현저제승소비자대식품질량안전적신임정도화액외지부의원。채용전업대호、합작사화룡두기업삼류현대농업생산경영주체적수거,이용Heckman량계단선택모형분석절강성식용농산품생산주체적질량안전다중인증행위후발현,생산주체적다중인증행위제수생산주체적경영규모、인력자본、자유품패상황등개체특정여시장결구특정현저영향외,환수도시장격려、주체책임압력화교역성본적현저영향。총체이언,생산주체적질량안전인증행위시재자신능력급배경약속하적성본수익권형,생산주체적질량안전다중인증행위경주요시수시장격려화주체내재책임적구동,이비정부적규제압력。
In markets with qualitative uncertainty, pricing on the basis of average quality will be unattractive to participants whose products are above average in quality, quality certification thus could be an alternative to exit from the market in such situation. Overlapping quality certification may significantly improve the consumer＇s confidence of the food quality and safety. This paper focuses on the multiple quality certification of agri-food producer in Zhejiang province. Based on the producer level data from household farms, farmer cooperatives and agricultural companies, the producer＇s certification status is modeled using Heckman two-step procedure. The first-stage results using Probit model show that,if the influence of the region which the producer is located, the product category and the type of producer are controlled, the producer＇s likelihood of cerlification is determined by the size, the human capital, the brand status, the level to which the producer＇s markets are diversified, external market incentive, internal entity responsibility, the transaction cost, while the role of the government regulation pressure and producer＇s resource capability is not significant. In the second-stage, the safety certification intensity of the producers has been studied with the application of the ordered Probit model after correcting sample selection bias. The results show that the number of standards to which a producer is certified is positively related to the size, the human capital, the brand status, external market incentive, internal entity responsibility, but inversely influenced by the level to which the producer＇s markets are diversified, and the transaction cost. In other words, the producer focusing on a few markets were more likely to certify to one quality standard, but less likely to certify to muhiple quality standards, and the producer focusing on out-province market were more likely to certify to multiple quality standards. External market incentive and internal entity responsibility enhance the propensity to be certified to multiple quality standards. While the transaction cost would curb the producer＇s propensity to be certified to multiple standards. In general, the producer＇s quality certification decision is the trade-off between the benefits and costs, and constrained by the resource capability of the producer and the environment which the producer faced to. The producer＇s behavior of quality multiple certification is driven more by market incentive and internal entity responsibility, not the government regulation pressure. The above analysis suggests that frequently-occurred food safety incidents have increased Chinese producers＇ responsibility about food quality and safcty, and the producer could be a reliable power to promote the food quality and safety. Basing on the conclusions all above, it is proposed that the regulation efforts of government in agri-food quality and safety market at this stage should focus on the construction of operation system to safeguard the market mechanism. Firstly, pay more attention to bring the producer＇s role into full play in food quality and safety, implement the institution to ensure the producer as the first responsibility entity to secure agri-food safety. Secondly, strengthen the supervision of the certification agencies and ensure the reliability of authentication information, and maintain an orderly circumstance of effective certification market. Thirdly, stricter authentication label regulations in product market are required to ensure the accuracy of information released by producers. At last. in order to ensure the practicability of the standards, the government should constantly communicate with the producers, continuously revise the standards according to the feedback from the producers, and reinforce the training and promotion of the standards.