CAJ | 학술논문

文章从上市公司高管激励的视角探求公司现金流操控行为产生的原因，具体将高管激励划分为显性激励和隐性激励，同时以现金流操控的三类报告动机为调节变量，探究高管激励与现金流操控的关系是否受到报告动机因素的干扰。通过对我国A股上市公司1999-2012年数据实证检验，发现高管薪酬刺激了现金流操控，高管持股比例能抑制现金流操控，高管隐性收益减少现金流操控，频繁的高管变更易滋生现金流操控；三类报告动机均显著调节了高管激励与现金流操控的关系。
문장종상시공사고관격려적시각탐구공사현금류조공행위산생적원인，구체장고관격려화분위현성격려화은성격려，동시이현금류조공적삼류보고동궤위조절변량，탐구고관격려여현금류조공적관계시부수도보고동궤인소적간우。통과대아국A고상시공사1999-2012년수거실증검험，발현고관신수자격료현금류조공，고관지고비례능억제현금류조공，고관은성수익감소현금류조공，빈번적고관변경역자생현금류조공；삼류보고동궤균현저조절료고관격려여현금류조공적관계。
This paper explores the reasons of cash flow manipulation from the perspective of senior executive incentive of listed companies, and classifies senior executive incentive into explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Meanwhile, the paper, taking three types of report motivation of cash flow manipulation as moderating variables, probes into whether the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation will be affected by the report motivation factors. After making an empirical test on the data of Chinese A-share market from 1999 to 2012, we find that senior executive incentive stimulates cash flow manipulation, the proportion of senior incentive shareholding restrains cash flow manipulation, implicit gains of senior executive reduce cash flow manipulation, and companies with a high senior executive turnover rate breed easily cash flow manipulation. We also notice that three types of report motivation moderate the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation significantly.