南方经济
南方經濟
남방경제
South China journal of Economy
2015年
3期
52~76
,共null页
市场化改革 高管权力 企业绩效 高管过度隐性私有收益
市場化改革 高管權力 企業績效 高管過度隱性私有收益
시장화개혁 고관권력 기업적효 고관과도은성사유수익
Marketization; Managerial Power; Firm Performance; Managerial Excessive PrivateIncome.
制度环境是影响我国高管薪酬契约发挥激励作用的重要因素,本文以市场化进程为背景,检验企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的关系,并探究市场化进程对上述关系的影响。研究发现:由于我国上市公司高管隐性薪酬契约普遍缺乏有效设计和监督,企业上期绩效与本期高管过度隐性私有收益负相关;随着市场化进程深入,民营企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系显著缓解,并且当民营企业高管权力较大时,市场化进程能够更加有效地抑制企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系,但是上述关系在国有企业中并未得到有效改善。进一步检验发现.市场化改革促使企业绩效和高管现金薪酬之间的相关性不断提高。本文的研究结果有助于揭示市场力量在提高高管薪酬契约激励有效性时发挥的作用及遇到的困难,为抑制国企高管过度隐性私有收益提供合理建议。
製度環境是影響我國高管薪酬契約髮揮激勵作用的重要因素,本文以市場化進程為揹景,檢驗企業績效與高管過度隱性私有收益之間的關繫,併探究市場化進程對上述關繫的影響。研究髮現:由于我國上市公司高管隱性薪酬契約普遍缺乏有效設計和鑑督,企業上期績效與本期高管過度隱性私有收益負相關;隨著市場化進程深入,民營企業績效與高管過度隱性私有收益之間的負相關關繫顯著緩解,併且噹民營企業高管權力較大時,市場化進程能夠更加有效地抑製企業績效與高管過度隱性私有收益之間的負相關關繫,但是上述關繫在國有企業中併未得到有效改善。進一步檢驗髮現.市場化改革促使企業績效和高管現金薪酬之間的相關性不斷提高。本文的研究結果有助于揭示市場力量在提高高管薪酬契約激勵有效性時髮揮的作用及遇到的睏難,為抑製國企高管過度隱性私有收益提供閤理建議。
제도배경시영향아국고관신수계약발휘격려작용적중요인소,본문이시장화진정위배경,검험기업적효여고관과도은성사유수익지간적관계,병탐구시장화진정대상술관계적영향。연구발현:유우아국상시공사고관은성신수계약보편결핍유효설계화감독,기업상기적효여본기고관과도은성사유수익부상관;수착시장화진정심입,민영기업적효여고관과도은성사유수익지간적부상관관계현저완해,병차당민영기업고관권력교대시,시장화진정능구경가유효지억제기업적효여고관과도은성사유수익지간적부상관관계,단시상술관계재국유기업중병미득도유효개선。진일보검험발현.시장화개혁촉사기업적효화고관현금신수지간적상관성불단제고。본문적연구결과유조우게시시장역량재제고고관신수계약격려유효성시발휘적작용급우도적곤난,위억제국기고관과도은성사유수익제공합리건의。
Institutional environment is an important factor in the incentive impact of executive compensation contracts. Using Marketization as a background, we examine the relationship between firm performance and the managerial excessive private income, and the impact of Marketization on these relations. We find that own to the absence of the validity design and supervisal, the firm performance of last period has a significant negative relation with managerial excessive private income. As the marketization speeding up, the negative relationship between firm performance of last period and managerial excessive private income has been significant relieved in the Non -SOE firms, and the influence is more significant if the CEO power is bigger. While the negative relationship between firm performance of last period and managerial excessive private income has not been relieved in the SOE firms. Also we find that the positive relationship between firm performance with managerial cash compensation has been great improved in the process of Marketization. Our research provides the theory support for the role of supervision of policy and the public moral restriction with the contract mechanism and the market mechanism in the governance of the self - interests behavior of the executive perks.