CAJ | 학술논문

为了降低技术创新网络成员采取机会主义行为的可能性,运用演化博弈方法分析在分配机制和监督机制下技术创新合作中机会主义的演化路径,并分析了在分配机制下是否存在最优的分配系数使得合作企业采取机会主义策略的可能性最小,讨论了是否惩罚成本越高网络成员合作效率越高。研究发现：利益分配系数在一定值时,可以使得合作企业采取机会主义策略的可能性最小;惩罚成本C在达到一定值时,可以使得企业合作的概率最高。
위료강저기술창신망락성원채취궤회주의행위적가능성,운용연화박혁방법분석재분배궤제화감독궤제하기술창신합작중궤회주의적연화로경,병분석료재분배궤제하시부존재최우적분배계수사득합작기업채취궤회주의책략적가능성최소,토론료시부징벌성본월고망락성원합작효솔월고。연구발현：이익분배계수재일정치시,가이사득합작기업채취궤회주의책략적가능성최소;징벌성본C재체도일정치시,가이사득기업합작적개솔최고。
In order to reduce the possibility of technological innovation network members taking opportunism behaviors,this article analyzes the opportunistic situation in the technology innovation cooperation based on the evolutionary game theory and further analyzes the optimal allocation coefficient in the allocation mechanism.It is analyzed whether there is the optimal allocation coefficient which could make the enterprises cooperate with each other most likely and discuss whether the higher the punishment is,the higher the efficiency of the network cooperation is.The study demonstrates that if the profit distribution coefficient can achieve a certain value,the enterprises will have the least possibility to adopt the opportunistic strategy.And when the punishment cost reaches a certain value,the enterprises will have the highest probability to adopt the cooperative strategy.