外国经济与管理
外國經濟與管理
외국경제여관리
Foreign Economies & Management
2015年
4期
15~28
,共null页
谢永珍 张雅萌 张慧 郑源
謝永珍 張雅萌 張慧 鄭源
사영진 장아맹 장혜 정원
董事会会议 非正式层级清晰度 非正式沟通 调节作用
董事會會議 非正式層級清晰度 非正式溝通 調節作用
동사회회의 비정식층급청석도 비정식구통 조절작용
corporate board meeting; informal hierarchy; informal communication; moderating role
本文基于委托代理理论、管家理论以及关系契约理论,以基尼系数作为董事会非正式层级清晰度,采用2010-2012年面板数据,验证深、沪两市上市公司董事会非正式层级清晰度对正式结构与会议频率的调节作用。结果发现：在不考虑非正式沟通时,董事长与总经理分离程度越高、董事会专业委员会设置程度越高,越需要召开更多的董事会会议以实现成员间的正式沟通;而当引入董事会非正式结构后,非正式层级清晰度负向调节两职设置和委员会设置对会议频率的正向影响。这意味着我国上市公司董事会成员的非正式沟通有助于缓解冲突、降低会议频率与治理成本。本研究的启发意义在于：在我国上市公司的资本市场约束力较低并存在差序格局的条件下,培养董事会成员间的信任关系、关注成员间的非正式沟通,将有助于降低董事会的治理成本。
本文基于委託代理理論、管傢理論以及關繫契約理論,以基尼繫數作為董事會非正式層級清晰度,採用2010-2012年麵闆數據,驗證深、滬兩市上市公司董事會非正式層級清晰度對正式結構與會議頻率的調節作用。結果髮現：在不攷慮非正式溝通時,董事長與總經理分離程度越高、董事會專業委員會設置程度越高,越需要召開更多的董事會會議以實現成員間的正式溝通;而噹引入董事會非正式結構後,非正式層級清晰度負嚮調節兩職設置和委員會設置對會議頻率的正嚮影響。這意味著我國上市公司董事會成員的非正式溝通有助于緩解遲突、降低會議頻率與治理成本。本研究的啟髮意義在于：在我國上市公司的資本市場約束力較低併存在差序格跼的條件下,培養董事會成員間的信任關繫、關註成員間的非正式溝通,將有助于降低董事會的治理成本。
본문기우위탁대리이론、관가이론이급관계계약이론,이기니계수작위동사회비정식층급청석도,채용2010-2012년면판수거,험증심、호량시상시공사동사회비정식층급청석도대정식결구여회의빈솔적조절작용。결과발현：재불고필비정식구통시,동사장여총경리분리정도월고、동사회전업위원회설치정도월고,월수요소개경다적동사회회의이실현성원간적정식구통;이당인입동사회비정식결구후,비정식층급청석도부향조절량직설치화위원회설치대회의빈솔적정향영향。저의미착아국상시공사동사회성원적비정식구통유조우완해충돌、강저회의빈솔여치리성본。본연구적계발의의재우：재아국상시공사적자본시장약속력교저병존재차서격국적조건하,배양동사회성원간적신임관계、관주성원간적비정식구통,장유조우강저동사회적치리성본。
Based on agency theory,stewardship theory and relational contract theory,this paper investigates the moderating role of informal board hierarchy,measured by Gini coefficient,in the relationship between formal board structure and board meeting frequency by using the panel data of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2012.It comes to the conclusions as follows：firstly,without the consideration of informal communication,higher levels of the separation of chairman and general manager and professional committees under the board of directors lead to more board meetings to achieve formal communication among directors;secondly,after the introduction of informal board structure,informal hierarchy plays a negative role in the positive effects of the separation of chairman and general manager and professional committees on board meeting frequency.The results show that informal communication among directors in listed companies is beneficial to the alleviation of conflicts and the reduction in meeting frequency and governance costs.It provides the enlightenment that under low capital market constraints and differential pattern in listed companies,the cultivation of trust between directors and the attention to informal communication among directors will be conducive to the decrease in governance costs of the board.
