CAJ | 학술논문

引入消费者对可追溯食品的支付意愿,利用博弈论分析不同决策情形下二级可追溯食品供应链中销售商和食品加工企业的最优策略。研究结果表明：在分散决策情形下,销售商在静态博弈均衡时不分担食品加工企业实施可追溯的成本,而是通过加大补贴力度激励食品加工企业提高食品的可追溯水平;在斯坦克尔伯格均衡时,销售商将选择对自己有利的成本分担比例和价格补贴系数的组合策略;基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型的收益共享契约则有助于激励各方实施食品安全可追溯机制。
인입소비자대가추소식품적지부의원,이용박혁론분석불동결책정형하이급가추소식품공응련중소수상화식품가공기업적최우책략。연구결과표명：재분산결책정형하,소수상재정태박혁균형시불분담식품가공기업실시가추소적성본,이시통과가대보첩력도격려식품가공기업제고식품적가추소수평;재사탄극이백격균형시,소수상장선택대자기유리적성본분담비례화개격보첩계수적조합책략;기우Rubinstein토개환개모형적수익공향계약칙유조우격려각방실시식품안전가추소궤제。
Considering the consumer preference,the Game theory is used to analyze the strategies for the retailers and the food processing enterprises to implement traceability in two-stage supply chain in different relationships and different status. The results show that,in the case of decentralized decision-making,the retailers in the static game equilibrium will not share implementation costs of traceability with the food processing enterprises,but will increase traceability subsidies to motivate the enterprises to improve the level of traceability,while in Stackelberg equilibrium,the retailers will choose the favorable strategy combination involving the ratios of implementation cost and price subsidies,which can achieve the same incentive effect; in the case of centralized decision-making,the revenue sharing contract based on Rubinstein bargaining model can motivate the parties to collaborate in traceability.