CAJ | 학술논문

本文关注了中国制度背景下，大股东与管理层的利益冲突问题。资金占用会激化大股东与管理层之间的冲突，大股东资金占用越多，管理层人员变更的可能性越大。本文使用1999—2010年中国上市公司数据进行检验，发现：（1）资金占用对管理层变更有显著影响，资金占用每增加一个标准差，管理层变更概率增加2．79％；（2）资金占用情况不同的公司，其高管能力（教育水平）不存在明显差异，资金占用对管理层人员变更的影响在国有企业与非国有企业均存在，且在国有企业关系相对较弱；（3）资金占用与管理层人员变更的关系仅存在于股权分置改革之前，股权分置改革之后消失。文章为理解大股东资金占用的经济后果提供了新的视角，也从管理层人员变更的角度提供了大股东资金占用不利于企业经营发展的一个具体路径。
본문관주료중국제도배경하，대고동여관리층적이익충돌문제。자금점용회격화대고동여관리층지간적충돌，대고동자금점용월다，관리층인원변경적가능성월대。본문사용1999—2010년중국상시공사수거진행검험，발현：（1）자금점용대관리층변경유현저영향，자금점용매증가일개표준차，관리층변경개솔증가2．79％；（2）자금점용정황불동적공사，기고관능력（교육수평）불존재명현차이，자금점용대관리층인원변경적영향재국유기업여비국유기업균존재，차재국유기업관계상대교약；（3）자금점용여관리층인원변경적관계부존재우고권분치개혁지전，고권분치개혁지후소실。문장위리해대고동자금점용적경제후과제공료신적시각，야종관리층인원변경적각도제공료대고동자금점용불리우기업경영발전적일개구체로경。
This paper focuses on the conflicts between large shareholder and managers under Chinese institutional environment. We infer that tunneling by large shareholder will increase the probability of managers＇ turn- over. Using data of Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2010, we find that：（ 1 ） Tunneling affects the prob- ability of managers＇ turnover significantly. A one standard deviation increase in tunneling is associated with a 2. 79% increase in the probability of managers＇ turnover. （2） The difference of managers＇ ability （education） among companies with different quality of tunneling is insignificant. The link between tunneling and managers＇ turnover exist in both SOEs and Non - SOEs. But the link in SOEs is weaker. （ 3 ） The link is weaker after Split - share reform. This paper not only provides a new perspective to the consequences of tunneling, but also offers a detail path of the negative effects of tunneling to performance.