CAJ | 학술논문

针对由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的双渠道供应链,研究了制造商直销渠道个性化服务的最优决策问题,并分析了在零售商渠道面临随机需求的情况下服务水平对零售商决策的影响。研究表明：在均衡状态下,随着线上消费者对个性化服务的偏好程度的提高,线上售价会提高,线下价格先降低后上升;当该偏好程度高于一定阈值后,供应链双方的利润都会大幅增加,双方从服务改进中获益;随着需求不确定性的增强,价格竞争加剧、利润降低;签订两部定价合同可实现双渠道供应链的协调并缓和渠道间的横向竞争。
침대유단일제조상화단일령수상구성적쌍거도공응련,연구료제조상직소거도개성화복무적최우결책문제,병분석료재령수상거도면림수궤수구적정황하복무수평대령수상결책적영향。연구표명：재균형상태하,수착선상소비자대개성화복무적편호정도적제고,선상수개회제고,선하개격선강저후상승;당해편호정도고우일정역치후,공응련쌍방적리윤도회대폭증가,쌍방종복무개진중획익;수착수구불학정성적증강,개격경쟁가극、리윤강저;첨정량부정개합동가실현쌍거도공응련적협조병완화거도간적횡향경쟁。
In this paper,in a dual-channel supply chain composed by one manufacturer and one retailer,the direct channel＇s personalized service decision is studied and its impact on retail channel which faces demand uncertainty is investigated.The result shows as follows：in the Nash equilibrium（NE）,as online consumers＇ preference for personalized service become stronger,online optimal price increase,offline price decreases firstly and then increases;if preference parameter exceeds a critical value,the profit level of two sides tends to increase obviously,which indicates both supply chain members benefit from service improvement;stronger demand uncertainty intensifies the horizontal price competition between channels,which results in profit losses;a two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain and alleviate the horizontal competition.