南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2015年
2期
4~14
,共null页
基金参与治理 高管非自愿性变更—业绩敏感性 控制性大股东
基金參與治理 高管非自願性變更—業績敏感性 控製性大股東
기금삼여치리 고관비자원성변경—업적민감성 공제성대고동
Fund Participant in Governance; Sensitivity between CEO Involuntary Turnover and Firm performance; Major Shareholder
基金作为重要的机构投资者在改善公司治理方面被寄予厚望,但是对基金能否在中国上市公司的治理中发挥积极作用则鲜有研究。本文首次按照基金监督对象的不同,将基金的监督作用分为"监督高管"和"监督大股东",从基金公司的治理状况出发检验在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中基金参与上市公司治理的途径。实证结果表明,在基金公司治理状况比较差的条件下,基金会与上市公司高管"合谋";而当基金公司治理状况比较好的条件下,基金公司在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中能够发挥"监督大股东"的治理作用;没有发现基金公司"监督高管"的证据。"监督大股东"假说的提出,既丰富了基金参与公司治理的理论,也是首次从企业微观决策层面发现基金在中国上市公司中发挥积极治理作用。
基金作為重要的機構投資者在改善公司治理方麵被寄予厚望,但是對基金能否在中國上市公司的治理中髮揮積極作用則鮮有研究。本文首次按照基金鑑督對象的不同,將基金的鑑督作用分為"鑑督高管"和"鑑督大股東",從基金公司的治理狀況齣髮檢驗在上市公司高管非自願性變更決策中基金參與上市公司治理的途徑。實證結果錶明,在基金公司治理狀況比較差的條件下,基金會與上市公司高管"閤謀";而噹基金公司治理狀況比較好的條件下,基金公司在上市公司高管非自願性變更決策中能夠髮揮"鑑督大股東"的治理作用;沒有髮現基金公司"鑑督高管"的證據。"鑑督大股東"假說的提齣,既豐富瞭基金參與公司治理的理論,也是首次從企業微觀決策層麵髮現基金在中國上市公司中髮揮積極治理作用。
기금작위중요적궤구투자자재개선공사치리방면피기여후망,단시대기금능부재중국상시공사적치리중발휘적겁작용칙선유연구。본문수차안조기금감독대상적불동,장기금적감독작용분위"감독고관"화"감독대고동",종기금공사적치리상황출발검험재상시공사고관비자원성변경결책중기금삼여상시공사치리적도경。실증결과표명,재기금공사치리상황비교차적조건하,기금회여상시공사고관"합모";이당기금공사치리상황비교호적조건하,기금공사재상시공사고관비자원성변경결책중능구발휘"감독대고동"적치리작용;몰유발현기금공사"감독고관"적증거。"감독대고동"가설적제출,기봉부료기금삼여공사치리적이론,야시수차종기업미관결책층면발현기금재중국상시공사중발휘적겁치리작용。
Fund is highly evaluated as an important institutional investors in corporate governance in both academic research and practices. But its governance role in Chinese listed companies is rarely explored. This article tries to contribute this issue from a new perspective, the different monitoring subjects.According to different kind of fund supervision, we classify the supervisory roles of the fund into "Executive Oversight" and "Major Shareholder Oversight", and further study the sensitivity between CEO involuntary turnover and corporate performance considering the difference of governance level of fund company.The empirical results show that, under the prevalence of major shareholder dominance in corporate decisions in Chinese listed companies, fund managers and executives of listed companies are prone to conspire to expropriate the minority shareholders when the fund corporate governance is relatively poor.But the fund company can play an important monitoring role in the decision-making of CEO involuntary turnover and constrain the major shareholder's self-interested behaviors when the fund corporate governance is relatively robust. In this situation, the fund may urge low-performance companies to adopt effective strategies to improve the performance instead of turnover the CEO, thus weakening the possibility of CEO involuntary turnover because of the poor performance. On the other hand, we don't find the evidence of the collusion between fund managers and firm executives.These results are different from that of Del Guercio et al.(2008) and Helwege et al.(2012) fund in the developed countries, are also different from that of Pan(2012) fund in China. The "Monitoring Major Shareholder" hypothesis not only enriches the theory of the Fund's par ticipation in cor porate gover nance, but also provide the micro-level evidence for the positive role of fund in the governance of listed companies in China. This article reveal a unique governance role of fund in their invested firms in China's emerging markets, also shows that China Securities Regulatory authorities' efforts to develop institutional investors as an important development mechanism are successful.